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ABSTRACT 
Crowdfunding is a method of raising funds to support a venture, typically by raising small 
amounts from a large number of investors (backers or patrons). This whole process is conducted 
on an online platform that facilitates interactions between project creators and potential 
contributors. We explore in the dissertation, the determinants of the success of crowdfunding 
projects. The first essay, using data from Kickstarter (the leading crowdfunding platform), 
explores how backers to a project are interconnected with other backers through their backing of 
common projects thus forming an implicit backer network. We find that backers that are in 
central positions within the network have an impact on other backers and, through them, affect 
the outcomes of projects by increasing the likelihood of project success, increasing funding and 
decreasing the time taken to reach the funding goal. The second essay explores the unique 
phenomenon of patronage. Unlike the one-time contribution that backers make in Kickstarter, 
patrons fund the creator and their projects in a recurring manner.  We use data from a leading 
patronage crowdfunding platform to explore what project characteristics lead to changes in 
patterns of patron growth and recurring contributions in crowdfunding. We find that several 
project characteristics not only have an impact on the change in patron and contribution 
functions but also in the velocity and acceleration of these functions. Both essays uncover 
determinants that have not been considered thus far in their respective crowdfunding context and 
provide recommendations for project creators and platforms to maximize the funding generated 
within each specific context. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Crowdfunding is a method of raising funds to support a venture, typically by raising 
small amounts from a large number of investors. Crowdfunding has been a relatively new 
concept and has developed largely in tandem with web accessibility. Over the past few years, 
crowdfunding has gained widespread visibility and acceptance, with crowdfunding growing 
exponentially since 2010. In 2015, it has surpassed the venture capitalist industry and is expected 
to continue growing (Reddy and Tan, 2017).  
Crowdfunding is conducted on online platforms that help facilitate the entire process. 
Platforms perform the function of a middleman that links up project creators and potential 
contributors, called backers. The entire process of crowdfunding typically follows a certain 
procedure in the past. A project creator requires funds for some venture. They go on the 
crowdfunding platform and create a page providing information on their project, how much 
funds they require, or the funding goal, and what they can offer backers. This project page will 
be active for a limited duration. Potential backers are able to view the page and decide if they 
want to contribute to the project. These backers may receive rewards in return for their 
contribution. With many backers contributing different amounts, if the project is able to meet its 
goal before the fixed duration, the creator can receive the funds and proceed with their venture. 
Crowdfunding has now evolved. Instead of the typical crowdfunding, we now see a wide 
variety of different crowdfunding models. The equity crowdfunding model allows a backer to 
own shares of business or startups. A debt based crowdfunding model allows project creators to 
borrow money from backers and these creators will have to pay back the loan along with a set 
amount of interest. A patronage crowdfunding model allows backers to fund project creators in a 
recurring fashion instead of the one-off funding used in previous models.  
2 
 
Crowdfunding outcomes are mainly dependent on three key players – the platform, the 
creator and the backer. Each platform has a specific crowdfunding model it adheres to. The 
creator can leverage on their experience, the effectiveness of their appeals, their personal 
network and other creator specific traits to solicit funds. The backer can be influenced by their 
personal preferences, digital buzz, their network of friends and other backer specific traits. 
Determinants from these three key players should be able to predict crowdfunding outcomes. In 
my thesis, I investigate uncharted areas within the crowdfunding domain. I look at an unexplored 
determinant, the implicit backer network, and observe how it, in conjunction with other control 
variables, can impact backers and project outcomes. I will also examine a new crowdfunding 
model, the recurring crowdfunding model, that is prominently distinct from previous 
crowdfunding models and discover the determinants that can impact crowdfunding outcomes.  
In my first essay, I explore the implicit backing network within a crowdfunding platform 
and the influence backers in central positions in the network have on other backers in the 
platform. Recent research has focused on understanding the factors contributing to project 
success on crowdfunding platforms.  However, there is relatively little research on the platform’s 
ability to link backers together by the projects that they have backed. I examine the importance 
of backer information on other backers and show that the removal of backer information from a 
crowdfunding platform exerts a negative effect on success rates. Using data from Kickstarter, I 
construct a weighted backer network based on 52,678 common projects backed by 11,134 
backers. Controlling for digital media mentions and project quality, I find evidence that backers 
in key positions within the network have an impact on other backers and, through them, affect 
the outcomes of projects by providing an 80% increase in the likelihood of project success, a 
158.87% increase in funding and decreasing the time taken to reach the goal by 3%. These 
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findings are extended by exploring the differential effects of several centrality specifications in 
identifying influential platform users within a network. 
In my second essay, I examine the patronage crowdfunding model. This crowdfunding model 
has three distinct differences from previous crowdfunding models: (1) funding is recurring and 
not a one-time contribution, (2) there is no fixed duration for the project and (3) instead of 
funding a project, patrons are funding a creator. The growth of patrons and contributions vary 
widely. I identify the determinants that an impact this growth and the dynamics associated with 
the rate of its growth, velocity and acceleration, at different stages of the crowdfunding process. 
Using data from Patreon, I obtain 3229 curves each that represents the growth of patrons and 
contributions. Using project type properties, different kinds of incentives, project presentation 
characteristics and different project categories, I find evidence that these determinants have a 
non-uniform impact on patron and contribution growth as well as on their dynamics. In order to 
control for heterogeneity, I proceed to cluster the curves and find more granular results that 
translates into specific recommendations for project creators and platforms utilizing the 
patronage model.  
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CHAPTER 2: CENTRAL BACKERS IN SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON THE OUTCOMES OF CROWDFUNDING PROJECTS 
Crowdfunding platforms have gained widespread visibility and acceptance over the last 
decade. It has grown from a market of US$880 million in 2010 to US$34.4 billion in 2015 
(Massolution 2015). By 2025, it threatens to overshadow the Venture Capitalist industry (Barnett 
2015) as it is slated to grow up to US$96 billion (The World Bank 2013). Even though the 
growth of crowdfunding platforms has generated many innovations leading to several 
spectacular successes, over 64% of projects do not get funded (Kickstarter 2016). As such, there 
is growing interest in understanding the factors that drive crowdfunding project success. 
Most recent studies focus on the structural components of crowdfunding projects, such as 
the type of project, funding goal, duration and number of tiers. There have also been research 
studying factors endemic to project creators such as their experience and previous successes 
(Mollick 2013; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). Our paper suggests that aside from individual 
project and creator factors, the community of backers on crowdfunding platforms also play an 
integral role in affecting crowdfunding project outcomes. This community, formed by a network 
of backers that fund the project also double as the project’s marketing team as they often help 
promote the project through word of mouth (Mikhaylova 2013).  
Our paper contributes to the crowdfunding literature by focusing on this community. We 
will explore the interactions of influential backers within the community can affect 
crowdfunding platforms. There have been papers that have looked at an individual backer’s 
effect on other backers such as the propensity for other backers to contribute to the project 
(Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb 2015; Burtch, Ghose and Wattal 2015; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 
2017). In this research, we use existing backer networks to identify the influential backers and 
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determine their impact on other backers and, through them, project outcomes. This network is 
weighted, reflecting the fact that links within real networks have differing strengths depending 
on the amount of interaction between backers within the network. Given that these networks are 
based on backers’ prior backing decisions and not on explicated stated links, we combine 
research on probabilistic networks (Ma, Krishnan and Montgomery 2015) with statistical 
procedures to account for network weights (Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz 2010) to estimate 
our backer network as a weighted network.  
We also seek to address how crowdfunding platforms view and value their users. The 
value of each user to the platform is ambiguous, given the fluid nature of interactions within 
online platforms. It will benefit platforms if they knew the financial value of users within the 
platform so that they will be able to plan policies that ensure a net profit to the firm.  In 
traditional customer lifetime value research, the network effects of the individual are not 
accounted for (Gupta and Zeithaml 2006). Our research moves to address this issue by 
quantifying the network influence of a particular user and their subsequent effect on project 
outcomes. In addition, the industry has used user activity as a way of identifying influence within 
the network. Our paper finds that influence through the users’ position within the network 
instead of user activity are the main drivers of project outcomes. 
Finally, much of the research in this domain is self-contained with studies using 
information sources within the platform. Recent research have started to explore linking media 
data with crowdfunding project outcomes such as using twitter data to infer how tweets can 
affect crowdfunding (Lu et al. 2015). We utilize a set of various digital media buzz variables 
such as blogs, forums, online media and social media as control variables to precisely evaluate 
the impact of these influential backers. A list of comparison between our contributions and our 
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contemporaries can be found in Table 1. [Insert Table 1] We begin by conceptualizing how the 
behaviour of backers are interdependent in the crowdfunding community with Figure 1 showing 
the main model our paper seeks to test. [Insert Figure 1] 
1 CROWDFUNDING 
Crowdfunding refers to the practice of funding a project by drawing on small 
contributions from many individuals (Mollick 2014). There are three primary players in 
crowdfunding - the platform, the project creators and the backers. The function of the platform is 
to provide a digital space for users to interact within and these users fall into two main 
categories; project creators who approach the platform seeking funds for an idea, and backers 
who approach the platform seeking projects that interest them. These two groups of users are not 
mutually exclusive since the platform allows any user to become a project creator. Platforms will 
receive a proportion of the total funds collected from each successful project as revenue to 
support their operating costs (Kickstarter 2016). Similarly, project creators will receive funds, 
real-time feedback and community exposure (Branson 2015) while backers may receive a perk 
or reward for backing the project. Even though research has shown that there is a tendency for 
the community to back projects in the same geographical area (Lin and Viswanathan 2015), 
crowdfunding will generally allow the backer community to serve as an unofficial validation for 
the success of the project in a wider market. These have led to successes that would have 
otherwise been denied funding through traditional channels held by experts such as venture 
capitalist investors (Mollick and Nanda 2015). Notable examples of successes include the Pebble 
Watch and Oculus Rift. However, these successes are exceptions to the norm. Only 35.89% of 
projects seeking funding on Kickstarter, the largest crowdfunding website, were successfully 
funded (Kickstarter 2016). Given the low success rates, it is in the interest of project creators and 
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crowdfunding platforms to understand the community around the platform and how it can 
contribute to project success. 
1.1 INTERDEPENDENCE OF BACKER COMMUNITIES 
In the crowdfunding space, users of a platform form an online community. Actions such 
as creating a project page for others to view, backing a project or viewing projects that other 
backers have backed are all forms of interaction within the community and require no direct 
communication between these users. This is consistent with prior research by Kozinets (1999) 
and Bagozzi and Dholakia (2002), who found that Internet users are likely to gravitate towards 
forming a community when connecting and interacting with other users. Evidence by Dass, 
Reddy and Iacobucci (2014) also suggests that individuals can become familiar with each other 
through online nicknames even if they do not communicate directly. Extending these findings, 
we expect that a community will be formed even though individual members of the community 
may not know or communicate with each other directly.  
Recent research suggests that users within a crowdfunding community can influence each 
other. There have been evidence of backers relying on types of information provided by other 
backers, such as the existence of herding effects based of other backers’ decisions (Kuppuswamy 
and Bayus 2017). Despite showing that backers rely on other backers for information, the 
information examined by prior research have mostly been aggregate actions of the entire backer 
body, such as the number of bids, amount backed or number of backers. Consequently, the 
notion that the actions of a singular backer may affect other backers has not been explored. 
Although previous research has not investigated the effects of a singular backer’s actions 
affecting other backers, there have been research that demonstrates that backers tend to pay 
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attention to individual information from other backers. Burtch, Ghose and Wattal (2015) 
observed that nearly 30% of individuals in their study viewed information on other backers 
directly before their contribution decision on a crowdfunding project. Similarly, research in 
micro-loan markets have found that lenders tend to observe lending decisions made by others 
and factor these decisions in their decision making process (Zhang and Liu 2012). 
The importance of an individual’s backing action is compounded when we consider 
information spillover effects. Backers who observe other backers’ backing actions before making 
their own funding decisions can in turn be used by others as a source of information when 
making decisions. This leads to an information cascade where actions by one individual in the 
can affect many others (Banerjee 1992). This is especially so in a decision-making scenario such 
as crowdfunding where people make decisions sequentially since the choices made earlier can be 
observed by others and may affect future decisions (Anderson and Holt 1997). 
To verify that backers use other backers as information, we collect data on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk from 24 respondents who had experience backing crowdfunding projects. 50% 
of respondents noted that they have used other backers’ contribution history to find projects to 
back. Respondents were also questioned on the importance of each information source that they 
used. They reported that the second most important source of information was “other backers 
that contributed to similar projects”. The results of these responses support our assertion that 
backers utilize other backers as sources of information.  
1.2 REMOVAL OF BACKER INFORMATION 
In order to further verify the evidence collected from crowdfunding user responses, we 
look at the effects after a policy change of Kickstarter, one of the largest reward crowdfunding 
sites, in 2014. Before December 2014, Kickstarter had a backer tab for each project. Backers 
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could access information on other backers of the project, which included projects that these other 
backers have backed in the past as well as projects that they are currently backing. No 
information on the amount that they backed was provided. As of December 2014, the backer tab 
has been removed by Kickstarter. This platform change provides a way to check if access to 
backer information by potential backers has any impact on project success. We find that 
removing backer information led to a decline in the success rates of all categories from 
November 2014 to December 2014, with the three largest categories of Games, Design and 
Technology suffering a drop of 26.71%, 33.57% and 15.38% in success rates respectively. This 
suggests that restricting backer information flow to other backers will lead to negative 
consequences such as the decrease of success rates. 
The results from this policy change gives credence to our view that backers use other 
backers for information as the removal of the backer tab resulted in an immediate drop in success 
rates since backers lose an important source of information. We seek to test this observation 
empirically by identifying potential influential backers through their positions within the 
platform and mapping their effects on other backers and on project outcomes. We expect that 
these backers should have an unequal amount of influence in being able to reach and influence 
other backers by the nature of their embeddedness in the platform community.  
2 INFLUENTIAL BACKERS WITHIN NETWORKS 
 We have established that backers do rely on other backers as sources of information. 
However, we have yet to substantiate the effect each of these backers have on others. 
 Past research have argued that when people interact with each other, certain individuals 
will have more influence over others and will exert an effect on other individuals’ decision 
making processes. For instance, Engel, Kegerreis and Blackwell (1969) have shown that 
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influential individuals such as opinion leaders have an impact on new products. Feick and Price 
(1987) also showed that consumers recognize that certain individuals have knowledge and 
expertise and are influential. More importantly, Goldenberg et al. (2009) have argued that the 
value of a customer to the firm includes not only the purchases made by the customer, but also 
the effect they have on others. Their study showed that people with large social ties known as 
hubs that can influence the adoption of new items on an online social network site. 
 Given the consensus that individuals have different levels on influence on others, we 
expect that influential backers should exist within our network. Research studying crowdfunding 
have found that this is likely to be true as users are not homogenous. Four different archetypes 
have been outlined in a qualitative study, two of which are of interest to us (Lin, Boh and Goh 
2014). These are Active Backers who are more knowledgeable and fund high quality projects 
early and Trend Followers who tend to be more risk averse and may look for projects which are 
popular or look to other backers for clues on what to back.  
 The industry recognizes the potential effects of these influencers as well, with third party 
platforms such as BackerClub, Krowdster and Backercamp promising to connect project creators 
to backers that have influence. Kickstarter have encouraged project creators to leverage on the 
“network effects of Kickstarter” and some creators have utilized this by reaching out to potential 
influential backers. For instance, Ministry of Supply, a firm that has crowdfunded several 
projects, has stated that they target and reach out to backers that have backed multiple projects, 
with the rationale that if “they have backed 20 or more projects, they are likely an influential 
backer” (Fenzi 2013). BackerClub and Krowdster has also used activity as an indicator with 
BackerClub stating that the average member has “backed 106 crowdfunding projects” 
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(BackerClub 2017) and Krowdster targeting “Super backers” that have backed “at least 10, 20 or 
even 50” crowdfunding campaigns (Krowdster 2017).  
Although evidence from research and industry presents the existence of influential 
backers, there has been a lack of consensus in methods used to identify these influential backers 
with research focusing more on backer characteristics to identify “active backers” while the 
industry uses the number of past projects backers have backed as a signal to identify influential 
backers. Given the lack of consensus in the metric to identify these backers, we propose a 
method that can be used to identify these influential backers as well as compare the influential 
backers identified by us against those identified by using industry consensus. 
2.1 CONCEPTUALIZING CENTRAL BACKERS 
In order to reliably identify influential backers in the crowdfunding context, we need to 
track influence through interactions between users. This influence can thus be inferred by a 
network that links backers together. One of the reasons for the absence of network structures in 
crowdfunding has been the difficulty in identifying a backer network. Most research on network 
influence deal with explicit connections such as tracking user influence via referrals (Trusov, 
Bucklin and Pauwels 2009) and friends (Trusov, Bodapati and Bucklin 2010). Due to the lack of 
explicit connections such as friend links, research of networks in crowdfunding have mainly 
focused on the number of Facebook friends the creator has instead of a backer based network 
(Mollick 2014; Zvilichovsky, Inbar and Barzilay 2014). Our study’s main focus is on project 
backers’ relations with other backers. Consequently, we do not have an explicit network to draw 
upon. Instead, we will use implicit links, the actual backing behaviour of backers, and a 
probabilistic method to construct an implicit backer network.  
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Since we have laid out the possibility of a network cascade effect that can result from 
backers using other backers as information sources, we will identify only a small group of 
influential backers to examine if they will be able to generate a large effect across the whole 
network. Our focus will thus be identifying this small group of backers. These backers will be 
identified through their positions within the network. Backers exist as nodes in the network, with 
links called edges connecting them. Social network research have identified several centrality 
measures that can quantify the amount of influence a node has (Kiss and Bichler 2008; Chen et 
al. 2011). We will look at several of these measures and use them to triangulate influential nodes 
within the network. We will then estimate the effects these nodes, or central backers, have on 
others within the network.  
2.2 INFLUENCE OF CENTRAL BACKERS ON PROJECT OUTCOMES 
 In our conceptualization, the crowdfunding process is interdependent, with interactions 
between backers forming an implicit backer network that will serve as a source of influence to 
backers within the network. Using existing interactions to model the implicit backer network 
provides us a way to identify key backers that play an important role in affecting other backers. 
We use centrality scores as a proxy of influence and theorize that the small group of backers that 
are central within the network will be able to affect other backers of crowdfunding projects. For 
this reason, we expect that the act of a central backer contributing to a crowdfunding project will 
increase the number of backers contributing to the project.  
H1: A central backer contributing to a project will have a positive effect on the number of 
backers contributing to the project. 
As mentioned before, a key indicator of crowdfunding is whether the project succeeds or 
fails (Mollick 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). However, there are several other measures 
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that can serve as determinants of project success as well, such as how much of the project goal 
was funded and the amount of time the project took to meet its goal. Research by Kuppuswamy 
and Bayus (2017) have used the percentage of goal funded as an indicator of project success. In 
order to explore the effects these central backers have on project outcomes, we posit that when 
central backers contribute to a project, the project is more likely to succeed. Consistent with our 
earlier hypothesis, as backers in central positions have a larger possibility of spreading their 
influence through the network, the act of backing a project will increase the likelihood that other 
backers seeking information on whether to contribute to a crowdfunding project may be affected 
by this act of backing. This increase in the number of backers will, in most cases, impact several 
project outcome variables. Therefore, we predict the following: 
H2a: Crowdfunding projects are more likely to succeed when central backers contribute to the 
project. 
H2b: Crowdfunding projects will generate higher percent funding when central backers contribute 
to the project. 
H2c: Crowdfunding projects will require a shorter time to meet its funding goal when central 
backers contribute to the project compared to projects with no central backer 
contribution.  
3 DATA 
Our primary data source for much of the project related (project description, goal amount, 
amount funded etc.) and backer related information (number of backers, backer history etc.) is 
Kickstarter.com, the largest reward crowdfunding platform. Kickstarter categorises its projects 
into 15 different categories. We chose three of the largest categories on Kickstarter, Design, 
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Games and Technology, for our study. These three categories represent more than half of 
Kickstarter, raising 58.3% of the total funds (Kickstarter 2016) and attracting over 56% of 
backers on Kickstarter (Kickspy 2015). Given their size, we expect these three segments to be 
appropriately representative of the backer network in Kickstarter.  
As of 2016, there have been over 28,000 projects launched in the Games category, 
accumulating a total of over $570 million. This amount, which represents over 20% of the total 
funds collected by Kickstarter, makes the Games category the largest category contributing to 
Kickstarter’s total funds raised. Even with the large amount of funds collected, the success rates 
of projects in the Games category remain at 34.8%. The paper will present main results from the 
Games category and use the Design and Technology categories as a robustness check.  To 
account for the possibility of external information outside the crowdfunding platform affecting 
project outcomes, we collect data relating to digital media buzz mentions as well. Data on digital 
buzz were gathered through online search engines and various media platforms. Other critical 
data such as network characteristics were estimated through the computation of the backer 
network. A summary of the data and data sources is presented in Table 2. [Insert Table 2]. 
3.1 BACKER NETWORK CONSTRUCTION 
To construct our backer network, we take a random sample of 300 Games projects from 
January 1 to 31 March 2014. Projects taken from this timeframe meets two conditions that are 
essential in our network formation; the backers chosen are recently active backers and there is a 
sufficient window where we can draw past backing actions from. As the basis of our network is 
formed from past backing actions, a larger window will facilitate a more accurate network 
estimation. The duration of our backing action window will thus be the entire backing history of 
these backers from Kickstarter’s inception in April 2009 to April 2014. Some of the projects in 
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the Games category were terminated by the project creators or Kickstarter before the end for 
several reasons (not much interest being shown, feasibility of the project etc.). We estimated 
models without these cancelled projects to eliminate any alternative explanations driven by 
cancelled projects that may affect our results. 
Our random sample of project and full sampling of the entire population of backers 
within this project will be used to construct a weighted adjacency matrix. This weighted 
adjacency matrix is a Backer to Backer matrix (Bij matrix) that has information on the links 
between each pair of backer in our network as well as their weights - in our case the number of 
common projects shared between backers. With this Bij matrix, we will move on to form our 
backer network. 
3.2 NETWORK CENTRALITY MEASURES 
Our study will make use of three centrality measures to triangulate central backers within 
our backer network. As the structure of a social network can be described by multiple network 
characteristics, we will use degree to capture local network effects such as cluster formation and 
other measures such as closeness and betweenness to capture global network effects such as 
network position (Ebbes, Huang and Rangaswamy 2016).  
Degree measures the number of edges the node has with other nodes and the strength of 
these edges. It identifies the quality of the relationship between backers (Freeman 1978). A 
backer that has many direct connections to other backers has a high degree score within the 
network. Similarly, a backer that has few connections but a lot of activity taking place between 
connections can also be said to possess high degree as well (Barrat et al. 2004). In the context of 
our network, a backer has backed a few common projects linked with many other backers as well 
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as a backer that has backed many common projects with a few backers may both possess a high 
degree score. We use a 0.5 tuning parameter created by Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz (2010) 
to treat edge weights and the number of edges with equal importance.  
Closeness is a measure of how quickly a node can access other nodes within a network 
(Freeman 1978). In the context of crowdfunding, it calculates the sum of distances of a backer to 
other backers in the network. The more central a node is, the lower its total distance from all 
other nodes. In the context of our network, a backer that can reach others within the network by 
passing through a smaller number of other backers has a high closeness score and thus more 
influential. We invert the weights and use them as costs to represent the cost of connecting two 
backers (Newman 2001). We complement this by using the 0.5 tuning parameter created by 
Opsahl, Agneessens and Skvoretz (2010).  
Betweenness quantifies a node’s ability to make connections with other groups of nodes 
in a network, namely where the node bridges the shortest path between two other pairs of nodes 
(Freeman 1978). If a backer is included in many paths linking other backers to each other, that 
backer is more likely to be influential as they have the potential to control communication within 
the network. In the context of our network, if a backer is the bridge between two different groups 
of backers, this backer has a high betweenness score and thus is said to be more influential. We 
use Brandes’ (2001) algorithm to calculate betweenness in weighted networks. Like previous 
measures, we complement this by using the 0.5 tuning parameter created by Opsahl, Agneessens 
and Skvoretz (2010).  
4 MEASURES 
Our paper explores the effects of central backers on three measures of project success:  
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Funding status is defined as a binary variable and captures whether the crowdfunding 
project was able to meet its funding goal (Zvilichovsky, Inbar and Barzilay 2013; Hu, Li and Shi 
2015; Mollick 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). Projects that meet the goal amount by the 
end of the Kickstarter funding period are considered successful. Projects that fall short of the 
goal amount are defined as unsuccessful and the funds will not be collected from the backers.  
Percent Funded measures how much funds the project was able to collect with respect to 
its funding goal (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017).  We define it as the percentage of the goal 
amount that was raised at the end of the funding period. This measure allows us to account for 
the magnitude of project success. A project which was able to raise the exact goal amount 
receives a score of 1.0.  A project with a score of 2.0 means that the funds raised is twice that of 
the funding goal. We calculate this metric by utilizing both the total funds raised and the funding 
goal amount from the Kickstarter project page.  
Goal Rate is a success measure aims to define how quickly the project was able to reach 
the goal.  The speed at which a project takes to meet its goal has not been formally explored in 
prior crowdfunding research. In order to partition out the effects central backers have on meeting 
the goal, we only consider successful projects since goal rate does not take into account projects 
that have failed to meet their goal. We use the number of days the project took to hit its funding 
goal relative to the stipulated project duration to calculate the proportion of time the project took 
to meet its goal. This measure ranges from 0 to 1, where a score of .8 means that the project 
reached its goal amount using only 80% of the funding duration of the project.  This metric is 
calculated from the project duration data from the Kickstarter project site and the longitudinal 
data on contributions from Kickspy.  
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 Backer variables play a pivotal role in our model as our hypotheses revolve around the 
effects that backers central to the network can have on other backers and project outcomes. As 
outlined previously, we estimate the implicit backer network based on backers’ previous backing 
decisions before identifying the 10 few influential backers within the network. 
No. of Central Backers is the focal variable of our study. These denotes the number of 
central backers who backed the project which are obtained by identifying backers who scored 
high in three forms of network centrality measures – degree, closeness and betweenness. As we 
plan to identify the top 10 central backers, this variable will be treated as a negative binomial. 
No. of Backers will denote the aggregate number of backers that have contributed to the 
project (Mollick 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). Our study’s backer variable excludes 
backers identified as central backers and only includes all other non-central backers.   
We include project characteristics to capture project heterogeneity. These characteristics 
are components that are found on the main page of Kickstarter projects and have been used in 
extant research to control for the differences in projects. We acquire data on different project 
characteristics and present them here as covariates in our model. 
Goal Amount is the amount of funds the project is seeking. It has been shown to have a 
negative effect on project success, with projects that have larger goal amounts being less likely to 
succeed (Marom and Sade 2013; Mollick 2013, Zvilichovsky, Inbar and Barzilay 2013, Mollick 
2014). 
Duration is the length of time the project has to reach its funding goal. This varies with 
projects, with the average duration length being 30 days. Duration has been shown to have a 
positive effect on project success, with projects that have a longer goal amount being more likely 
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to succeed (Mollick 2013; Zvilichovsky, Inbar and Barzilay 2013; Mollick 2014; Agrawal, 
Catalini and Goldfarb 2015; Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). 
Creator Experience is the number of previous projects started by the creator. This data is 
taken by examining the history of the project creator and the number of projects that the creator 
had before the current project. Previous research has found support that a creator’s past successes 
will affect their current project’s likelihood of success (Marom and Sade 2013; Zvilichovsky, 
Inbar and Barzilay 2013). 
Tiers represent the number of reward tiers offered by the project. Reward tiers consist of 
an amount associated with the tier as well as a reward. Backers whose contributions meet or 
exceed that amount will be eligible for the reward in that tier. The reward can range from 
appreciation to the product featured. Previous research has shown that tiers will affect backer 
support (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017).   
Video is a binary variable that captures whether the project has a video on its project 
description page. This variable has been used by many crowdfunding researchers (Mollick 2013; 
Mollick 2014; Agrawal, Catalini and Goldfarb 2015, Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). The 
presence of video is considered as an effective information source and is expected to have an 
impact on the evaluation of the project by backers and on the success of the project.  
The number of updates posted by the project creator for the duration of the project is also 
important. Previous research has shown that updates affect backer support and success rate 
(Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017).  
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To assess the impact of different digital media buzz on backers, we collect data on the 
digital media buzz that was generated for the duration of the crowdfunding project campaign. 
We collect this data through scraping search engine results and record all mentions of the project.   
There are four avenues of digital media buzz that we focus on – Forums, Online Media, 
Blogs and Social Media. Forums are online threads or pages that moderators maintain while 
other users post responses on. Online Media sites are sites that allow media such as pictures or 
videos to be shared. They include Podcasts, Tumblr, Instagram and Deviantart. Blogs are created 
by users and are often written in an informal or conversational style. Social media are posts on 
Twitter, Facebook or Google Plus. The data are gathered from the number of mentions in these 
respective avenues of digital media for the duration of the project.  
A possible endogeneity that surfaces in our model is that an omitted variable, project 
quality, may be driving both central backers and backers to contribute to certain types of 
projects. In this case, any connection between central backers and backers may be due to project 
quality and not what our study hypothesizes. We use three different variables to account for 
project quality – whether the project has a video and the innovativeness and feasibility of the 
project. A project that has a video is often seen as an indicator of project quality and has been 
shown in past research (Mollick 2014). Innovativeness is the novelty of a project from a 
technological and market standpoint. This variable has been used on new projects to denote 
product quality (Kleinschmidt and Cooper 1991; Poetz and Schreier 2012). Feasibility is a 
measure of the likelihood of the project being a success in the market and has similarly been 
adapted from previous research on new products to show product quality (Poetz and Schreier 
2012). Given that Innovativeness and Feasibility are subjective measures of new products, we 
use three different raters to rate all 300 projects on these variables. Due to the nature of 
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crowdfunding, we use the proportional reduction in loss measure by Rust and Cooil (1994) to 
measure ratings for new products and find that our measures have a 75% inter-rater reliability. 
Table 3 shows provides descriptive statistics of the data gathered. We further ran a 
collinearity test and verified that there were no multicollinearity issues. [Insert Table 3] 
5 MODEL FORMULATION & ESTIMATION 
We model the impact of our predictor variables on crowdfunding project success for 
project k as follows:  
Projoutk =  β1NCBk + β2NBk + β3Goalk + β4Durk + β5NPastk + β6NTiersk + β7Videok
+ β8NUpk + β9BZSock + β10BZBlogsk + β11BZForumsk + β12BZMediak
+ εProjoutk 
NCBk =  β13Goalk + β14BZSock + β15BZForumsk + β16BZBlogsk + β17BZMediak
+ β18Videok + β19Feask + β20Innovk + εNCBk 
NBk =  β21NCBk +  β22Goalk + β23BZSock + β24BZForumsk + β25BZBlogsk + β26BZMediak
+ β27Videok + β28Feask + β29Innovk + εNBk 
for projects k = {1,2,…}, where 
Projoutk = Outcome of project k, (success status of the project k, percentage of the 
goal funded for project k or the rate that the project k takes to reach its goal). 
Status of the project will be analysed using a probit model as it is binary for 
failure and success,  
NCBk = Number of central backers that contributed to project k, 
NBk = Excluding central backers, the number of backers that contributed to project k, 
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Goalk = the goal amount that project k sought to raise, 
Durk = the funding window duration allocated for project k, 
NPastk = the number of past projects the creator of project k had on Kickstarter, 
NTiersk = the number of reward tiers project k had, 
Videok = a binary variable denoting if project k had a video or not, 
NUpk = the number of updates project k had, 
BZSocialk = the number of mentions project k had on social media sites, 
BZForumsk = the number of mentions project k had on forums, 
BZBlogsk = the number of mentions project k had on blogs, 
BZMediak = the number of mentions project k had on online media sites, 
Innovk = the innovativeness rating of project k, 
Feask = the feasibility ratings of project k. 
Variables are all mean-centred and standardized except for outcome variables and the 
central backer variable which is treated as a negative binomial. We estimate the three equations 
simultaneously using a full information maximum likelihood method.  
6 NETWORK ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Our constructed backer network has 11,134 backers. These backers are active users, 
meaning they backed more than one project in the duration of our study. We impose this 
constraint as backers who have backed one project have little activity within the platform and are 
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unlikely to influence other backers, hence they are excluded when computing our network. We 
compile the complete backing history of these backers from April 2009 to April 2014, resulting 
in a total of 51,678 unique projects. Based on this backing history, we create a Bij matrix of over 
61 million symmetric cells with approximately 29 million connections. Of the backers who 
shared joint projects, there was a shared average of 1.5 common projects. [Insert Figure 2] 
From our Bij matrix, we derived the backer network. The three centrality measures - 
degree, closeness and betweenness, were estimated for each backer. We find that the majority of 
backers have low centrality scores with only a small proportion with high scores. Given that a 
random network will conform to a larger degree of homogeneity, our backer network with its 
high clustering, high modularity and few nodes scoring high on centrality exhibits non-random 
properties. This centrality distribution provides evidence that only a small proportion of backers 
score high on each individual centrality measure. As each centrality measure indicates a different 
measure of influence within the network, we will triangulate our central backers by utilizing all 
three measures to identify these backers. To conform to our argument that a small number of 
backers will be able to drive influence within the network, we identified the top 10 backers who 
scored high in all three centrality measures. With our influential backers identified through their 
centrality scores, we proceed to estimating our model.  
7 EMPIRICAL MODEL RESULTS 
We use a random sample of 300 projects to compute our model. We first present the 
effects of the presence of central backers on crowdfunding projects using descriptive data in 
Figures 3a, 3b and 3c. Projects were split depending on whether they had any central backers 
contributing to the project. On average, 85% of the 103 projects backed by central backers were 
successfully funded whereas only 24% of the 137 projects that were not backed by central 
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backers were successfully funded (t=-12.11, p<.01). Similarly, projects with central backer 
contributions gained significantly higher funding than projects without central backers, achieving 
465.6% funding instead of 61.54% (t=-2.95, p<.01). Although projects with and without central 
backers do not have any significant difference in goal rate, the other results are encouraging as 
they give credence to our hypotheses. Taking these results into consideration, we move on to an 
empirical analysis of our results.  [Insert Figure 3] 
The results of the model for Games Category are presented in Table 4. [Insert Table 4] 
Based on the results in Table 4, we can see that consistent with our first hypothesis, the 
number of central backers have a positive impact on the number of backers contributing to a 
project (β=.27, p<.01; β=.27, p<.01 and β=.20, p<.01). Furthermore, in line with previous 
research, we find that the number of backers significantly affected project outcomes, with more 
backers leading to a higher likelihood of success (β=2.95, p<.01), higher percentage funded 
(β=5.94, p<.01) and shorter time to reach the goal (β=-.12, p<.01). This provides support for 
H2a, H2b and H2c since this suggests that central backers can indirectly increase the likelihood of 
project success, increase the funding of a project and reduce the time taken to fund the project.  
 Our analysis on control variables for our model yielded results that are consistent with 
prior research. To control for project differences, we included several project characteristics. 
Table 4 showed that the project’s goal amount negatively affects the project success status (β=-
1.28, p<.01) and percent funded (β=-2.13, p<.01) but positively affects the time taken to reach 
the goal (β=.18, p<.01). Previous research has shown that goal amount affects the likelihood of 
project success, with projects that have a larger goal amount taking a longer time to achieve 
success (Marom and Sade 2013, Mollick 2013, Zvilichovsky et al. 2013, Mollick 2014, 
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Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). We also found that for goal rate, goal amount has a positive 
significant relationship with central backers, with a larger goal amount corresponding to a higher 
number of central backers contributing to the project (β=.41, p<.01).  
Our estimates also show that the number of updates affect both funding status (β=.75, 
p<.01) and percent funded (β=1.47, p<.05). This corresponds to what Mollick (2014) and 
Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017) found in their research. The number of updates can signify the 
project creators’ commitment to the project as well as provide an avenue of interaction for 
creators and backers, leading to a higher likelihood of funding success.  
We next examine the effects of digital media buzz on backers. We find a strong effect of 
digital media buzz on both backers and central backers. Our results indicate that backers are 
significantly affected by Forums, Online Media and Social Media, with these forms digital media 
buzz showing significant positive effects on the number of backers that a project has. Central 
Backers however are slightly more complex. Although the digital medium of forums and blogs 
have significant positive effects on central backers, the medium of online media and social media 
have negative significant effects on central backers. This discrepancy can be explained by 
research on source credibility. Prior to this, we have suggested that central backers are “expert” 
backers and will tend to critically judge sources of information. Research on credibility on the 
web have observed that users tend to judge sources by surface credibility as well as message 
credibility (Wathen and Burkell 2002). Furthermore, projects that tend to have more posts in 
online or social media tend to be split into two groups – projects that are interesting and creative 
or projects that are ludicrous or have negative reputations, with the latter occupying a larger 
proportion of the market share. This has been corroborated by a study showing that negative 
news tend to be spread more on social media such as Twitter (Hansen et al. 2011). These two 
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reasons combined will lead central backers to either ignore social and online media or to be 
affected negatively after objectively judging the information. These results suggest that project 
creators should generate interest in their project by using forums and blogs primarily to attract 
central backers and backers. 
To sum our results up, the number of central backers has a direct (β=.41, p<.05) and 
indirect effect on status, with central backers having a positive effect on backers (β=.27, p<.01) 
and backers having a positive effect on funding status (β=2.95, p<.01) suggesting that projects 
that have central backers being able to achieve successful funding. However, the number of 
central backers only has an indirect effect on percent funded and goal rate, with central backers 
having a positive effect on backers (β=.27, p<.01; β=.20, p<.01 respectively) and backers having 
a positive effect on percent funded (β=5.94, p<.01) and goal rate (β=-.12, p<.01), suggesting that 
projects that have central backers will increase project funding by 158.9% and decrease the time 
taken to reach the funding goal by 3%. [Insert Figure 4] To verify our results, we ran a mediation 
analysis on our data. The mediation analysis mirror our results, with central backers having an 
indirect effect on project outcomes. 
7.1 COMPARISON BETWEEN CENTRAL BACKERS & LARGE BACKERS 
We have shown in our previous analysis the impact of central backers in an implicit 
backer network on crowdfunding project success. As mentioned, the industry tends to view  
backers that have backed many projects as generally influential. Similarly, research has shown 
that users with the highest activity rates are generally influential within the platform (Trusov, 
Bodapati and Bucklin 2010). In the previous analysis, 50% of our previously identified central 
backers can be considered as large backers since they are also within the top 10 backers that back 
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the most projects. We thus pose this question to our research: can the market identify influential 
backers also based solely on the number of previous projects backed?  
To separate the effects of centrality and size of backing activity, we re-estimated our 
model using two mutually exclusive sets of backers – Large Backers and Exclusively Central 
Backers. Large Backers are defined the top backers based on the number of previously backed 
projects but are not within the top backers scoring high on all three centrality measures. 
Exclusively Central Backers are the top backers based on centrality scores but are not within the 
top backers based on size. We re-estimated our model based on the top 10 backers of each group. 
To visualize the difference between the presence of Large Backers and Exclusively 
Central Backers, we compare projects backed by these two groups in Figure 5. Figures 5a, 5b 
and 5c illustrate how the presence of Large Backers will affect project outcomes. We find that 
Large Backers are distinctly dissimilar from Exclusively Central Backers. Comparing the 
presence of Exclusively Central Backers (Figure 6) to the central backers identified in our main 
model (Figure 3), we see a similar pattern, with projects backed by both these types of backers 
outperforming projects not backed by them. However, unlike projects backed by central backers, 
projects backed by Large Backers display contrasting results. We observe that projects backed by 
Large Backers perform worse than projects that were not backed by them in all three project 
outcomes. The disparity between Large Backers and Exclusively Central Backers demonstrates 
that there is a difference between them and Large Backers are unlikely to generate the impact 
shown by central backers. [Insert Figure 5] 
To empirically test the difference between Large Backers and Exclusively Central 
Backers, we repeat our estimation using these two groups. Our results show that unlike central 
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backers, Large Backers do not significantly affect the number of backers in both our funding 
status and percent funded models. However, we do find that Large Backers have an indirect 
effect on goal rate, with a direct effect on number of backers (β=.31, p<.01) and a significant 
effect of number of backers on goal rate (β=-.15, p<.01). Comparatively, evidence based off 
Exclusively Central Backers show that these backers have an indirect effect on all three project 
outcomes. This implies that backers scoring high on centrality and large backers are 
fundamentally different, with backers high in centrality affecting the network and consequently 
project outcomes while Large Backers having little influence on other backers in most project 
outcomes. [Insert Table 5] 
Aside from using large backers, we used the top backers that scored high on each 
individual centrality score and found that regardless of the centrality score, the results conformed 
with our initial finding, showing that our results are not sensitive to the centrality score used. 
7.2 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS & ENDOGENEITY 
As noted in our analyses, our current model incorporates the impact of the top 10 backers 
scoring high on all three centrality measures. For assessing the validity of using a small group of 
central backers, we explored the possibility that expanding the amount of identified central 
backers would affect our results. We replicated the analysis by identifying the top 20,50 and 100 
backers that scored high in centrality. Similarly, to ensure that the finding is not category 
specific, we constructed backer networks for the two other largest categories, Design and 
Technology and estimated our model. The results of this analysis presented in Table 6 show that 
the key findings relating to central backers still hold even if we were to identify a larger number 
of central backers. Similarly, the results hold for both the Design and Technology categories as 
29 
 
well, with the only exception being percent funded in the Design category. This shows that our 
results are relatively robust. [Insert Table 7] 
In our previous model, we strove to address the endogeneity of project quality by using 
established variables that are linked to project quality to disentangle its effects from both backers 
and central backers. However, this is a theory driven approach. We test our model by using a 
statistically driven approach to deal with the endogeneity. We use the copula method put forth by 
Park and Gupta (2012) to couple the correlation between the central backer variable and the 
structural error. This method statistically handles endogeneity and requires no instrument. After 
including the copula control function to deal with the endogeneity, we can see that the number of 
central backers still retain a significant impact on the number of backers, showing that project 
quality is not the omitted variable driving the effect. [Insert Table 7] 
8 DISCUSSION 
Our results provide evidence that backers in central positions within the backer network 
of a crowdfunding platform have an impact on other backers and through them, on the outcomes 
of crowdfunding projects. Although data on users in platforms are now widely available, explicit 
interactions between backers may not be explicitly visible. Our research shows that network 
methods can be used on joint incidences of decisions made by users to map a user interaction 
network. These user interaction networks are shown to be able to identify key users that 
contribute significantly to crowdfunding outcomes.  
Our research addresses constructs within the crowdfunding platform that researchers lack 
an accurate understanding on. Crowdfunding platforms provide a space for platform users to 
interact, however these interactions are not explicitly recorded. Our study offers a practical 
30 
 
solution to the implicit network by championing the formation of a probabilistic network based 
on users’ past actions. We show that information on these past actions are valuable through a 
natural experiment and recommend a set of centrality scores that can be used to identify central 
backers within the network. We further incorporated a comprehensive list of digital media buzz 
into our model as well, addressing the call for such data to be included by past research 
(Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017).  
On a fundamental level, firms holding more in-depth knowledge on the backer network 
can seek out backers that have been central to the network. Even when platforms lack an explicit 
network, our research has shown that firms can construct a probabilistic network based on 
backers past backing actions and use this to identify central backers. Once these backers are 
identified, firms can target them for marketing purposes such as engaging them by soliciting 
feedback about their product. 
Running some policy simulations, we estimate that an additional central backer backing a 
project will have indirect effects by ensuring the success of a crowdfunding project. Similarly, it 
will increase the funding of a project by 158.9% and decrease the time taken to reach the funding 
goal directly by 3%. These statistics underscore the importance of central backers as a key metric 
that crowdfunding platforms should consider when implementing any changes to the platform.  
What then can the crowdfunding platform do to leverage on this finding? One of the 
ways the platform can increase the influence of these central backers is to provide an easy way 
for backers to locate and observe each other. This transparency of backer information is 
important and can affect the platform and its user network adversely if removed. Kickstarter’s 
decision to remove the backer tab illustrates the difficulty crowdfunding platforms face in 
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balancing the amount of information provided to maximize the benefits it can provide while 
minimizing the privacy issues that will be encountered. As the detail of backer information 
provided increases, there will be a positive effect from the network since allowing access to 
information can encourage the formation of a backer network and the resulting spread of social 
influence within the network can generate positive crowdfunding project outcomes. Backers will 
be able to seek out projects that they would have otherwise not found through the network. 
Benefits accrued from network effects can expand depending on the amount and scope of 
information that is freely available. However, there is also the negative impact of information 
transparency stemming from privacy concerns, thus platforms need to protect contributors and 
allay fraud concerns (Burtch, Ghose and Wattal 2015). Current trends in privacy concerns have 
led to information on backers being removed or hidden from the network. From a backer’s 
perspective, the positive effects of the backer network will be offset by the negative effects of 
privacy after information detail passes a certain threshold. After a certain level, information on 
backers becomes so invasive that any benefits accrued by the backer is effectively cancelled out.  
This becomes a delicate balancing act for platforms as they survive by creating value through the 
interaction of its users. If one group of users, such as backers, feel that their concerns are not 
addressed, they may choose to withdraw from the platform. This can lead to the collapse of the 
platform. As such, the platform will suffer losses if privacy concerns start overriding the benefits 
gained from the availability of information to backers. [Insert Figure 6] 
Our study’s findings suggest that it is in the interest of crowdfunding platforms to 
identify the inflection point where the positive effects of the network will be offset by the 
negative impact of privacy issues. This maintains a balance of encouraging the formation of a 
backer network while at the same time managing privacy concerns. We propose that managers 
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can consider two methods to obtain balance between the two. One possible method relates to the 
quality of the information provided. Crowdfunding platforms can allay privacy concerns by 
identifying users not by usernames but by a serial number. Centrality scores can be shown in 
these profile pages and a suitable metric label such as ‘influence points’ can be created. This 
suggestion allows information that assists in the formation of the backer network to be present 
while preserving the anonymity of the individual. As such, backers can follow central backers on 
the platform. Similarly, crowdfunding platforms or project creators can target these central 
backers by encouraging them to back projects due to their positive impact on other backers.  
The second possible method relates to formulating the network without information being 
disclosed. Platforms can create an artificial network and use simple identification criteria to 
identify central backers. Our paper explores an organically formed network that is developed 
largely without control from the platform. However, since privacy is a concern and platforms 
may not want to release information on backers, platforms can choose to artificially form their 
own backer network. Individuals can be identified by crowdfunding platforms as star backers 
and can be listed on the site itself. For instances, individuals that are active in each category can 
be identified and segmented into further subcategories. Individuals can take the role of experts in 
their respective subcategories and other backers can follow them. Platforms that can manage this 
will be able to benefit from network externalities.  
8.1 LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several limitations to our research. One of the key limitations we face is data 
availability. Our primary data source, Kickstarter, does not provide the exact time backers 
contribute to a project so we lack the means to obtain directional data for our network. The 
network in our study is a weighted undirected network. We can observe the connection between 
33 
 
two backers in the network but not identify the order in which they are linked. To address this 
issue, we impose an additional assumption of symmetry between the nodes (Bramoulle and 
Fortin 2010). This assumption assumes that the links are bi-directional, forming a more 
conservative representation of a network. This operationalization makes our desired effect harder 
to detect due to the additional noise available in the network. As we are able to establish the 
effect of central backers even with an undirected network, a directed network should only serve 
to strengthen our findings. To further verify this, future research be expanded to crowdfunding 
sites that have temporal data and across other different categories. 
8.2 CONCLUSION 
With the advent of big data on networks and communities that form around online 
platforms, the potential to exploit network targeting strategies has become an opportunity for 
platforms, however it may be expensive and inefficient to target users within the network that 
have little influence. Our findings point to methods that can be used to locate and target platform 
users. We indicate that platforms should identify the optimal amount of information that should 
be managed to reap the rewards that network effects can bring while minimizing the detrimental 
effects of the loss of privacy for their users. Our results show that instead of removing 
information that can potentially link backers with each other, these sites should instead 
implement certain systems that increase the ease in which backers can link up with other backers 
while ensuring anonymity. This would not only allow backers to identify projects they may be 
interested in but also increase the likelihood of crowdfunding project success and improve the 
efficiency and profitability of the site itself. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DYNAMICS OF RECURRING CROWDFUNDING - EXPLORING 
DETERMINANTS AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF THE CROWDFUNDING PROCESS 
With the rapid growth of the digital economy, there is an increasing focus on how 
businesses and individuals can leverage on its expansion to their benefit. A key component of the 
growth of this digital economy is emergence of a new class of content creators. Before the 21th 
century, companies were the main creators of content. However, with the transformation of the 
digital landscape, previous consumers are no longer passive receivers of content but have instead 
become active creators of content (Fader & Winer 2012). This led to the explosion of the digital 
content market, with the market exceeding an estimated US$549 billion by 2019 (Technavio 
2015).  
A substantial proportion of this growth is captured in sharing platforms that allow 
individuals to create and upload their content. Although certain platforms do allow content 
creators to earn revenue from their content, the process is difficult and as such monetizing their 
content has become one of the biggest challenges for online content creators (Ernst & Young 
2010). As creators seek to find new ways to fund their content, there has been a surge towards 
one of the new models of raising funds online – Crowdfunding. 
Our research studies the emerging context of crowdfunding creators instead of projects. 
Previous research in crowdfunding have focused on crowdfunding singular projects and factors 
that affect their funding within a fixed duration and with a targeted funding amount (Mollick 
2014, Kuppuswamy & Bayus 2017). Our research focuses on the crowdfunding patronage 
model, a long term recurring funding model for funding creators. There is uncertainty in how 
project characteristics impact a long-term crowdfunding project aimed at funding creators at 
different stages of its crowdfunding process. We build on this stream of research by striving to 
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provide an understanding of this new model of crowdfunding and how different project 
characteristics can affect the growth of the number of contributors and the amount of funding a 
project receives at different periods in time. Using a recurring crowdfunding site, Patreon, we 
explore how project characteristics affect the number of contributors, or patrons, across time as 
well as the contribution amount across time. We analyse not only the magnitude of patrons and 
contributions but also their dynamics such as velocity, the rate at which patrons and 
contributions change, and acceleration, the rate at which velocity changes. The influence of these 
project characteristics is captured across time to identify at which stage of the crowdfunding 
process they will have an impact on. We compare our results to existing crowdfunding research 
and explore how this new model reinforces or contradicts our current understanding of 
crowdfunding.  
We further extend our research by identifying different clusters of crowdfunding projects 
based on the dynamics of their contribution functions (Dass and Shropshire 2012). Each of these 
clusters are affected by different project characteristics and they will react differently over a wide 
duration. With this information, content creators will be able to identify the patterns of patron 
and funding growth at a more specific level. With this a deeper understanding on the project 
characteristics that drive patrons and contributions across different stages, creators can optimally 
utilize different project characteristics at different time periods to maximize the value of their 
project. Policymakers of recurring crowdfunding platforms can further tailor their platform 
architecture to accentuate different information indicators that are deemed important by funding 
contributors so as to attract contributors and increase the revenue generated by the platform. In 
doing so, we seek to address the concerns the crowdfunding industry have on the recurring 
funding process. Our research will also be of interest to academics as long-term funding has been 
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a phenomenon that has not been explored in the context of crowdfunding even though it has been 
expanding in the industry (Chaykowski 2018). 
1 FUNDING CONTENT IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
Digital content- content distributed through electronic channels, is gaining increasing 
importance in the current digital economy. In recent years, users of the web have moved past 
purely communication with others to the creation and consumption of digital content. Digital 
content has become so prominent that it has established itself as a cornerstone of the digital 
society (Rowley 2008). The evolving nature of the web has further allowed many users to easily 
transition into content creators (Cormode and Krishnamurthy 2008). Put together, this trend 
shows that as the effort required in content creation and distribution decreases due to continued 
improvement in technology, a greater amount of content and services will thus become readily 
available and as such, will gain increased importance in the digital landscape (World Economic 
Forum 2016). Evidence of this is in the exponential growth of the digital content market with the 
global digital video content market alone being slated to grow to $121.47 billion by 2020 
(Technavio 2016).  
Much of the growth in digital content comes from a large plethora of user-generated 
content online. One of the biggest user-generated platform, Youtube, has more than 400 hours of 
content uploaded every minute, which serves as a testament to the increasing importance of user-
generated content (Tran 2017). To cater to the increase in digital content and the value that it 
provides, a large number of platforms now provide a location to host these different forms of 
content. Many of these platforms run on a model where they rely on users creating the content to 
sustain themselves from advertising revenue. In order to maximize profits, platforms allow users 
to have free access to rely on network effects to draw in a large base of users (Parker and Van 
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Alstyne 2005). This coupled with the ease of uploading content on the platform has encouraged 
more users to become content creators within the platform as the nature of online platforms 
allow users within the platform can easily shift between a content consumer to a content 
producer (Parker et al. 2016). An example of this is Youtube, the largest video sharing website 
with a business model that rely on their users creating content (Burgess and Green 2009). Other 
examples of platforms that serve as intermediaries for hosting user-generated content include 
deviantArt for artwork, Wordpress for novels and Soundcloud for music and podcasts. Through 
these platforms, users are able to share their content with the rest of the web. 
However, in recent years, as platforms continue to grow, there has been a push within the 
platforms themselves to develop a sustainable business model to maintain the level of user-
generated content. In order to provide incentives for content creators to continue producing 
content, many of these business models allow content creators to obtain a cut of the profits. For 
instance, Youtube switched its business model in 2012 to incorporate advertisements to allow 
both Youtube and large content creators to generate income through brand advertisers (Lawler 
2012). This has been expanded in 2014 to distinguish between successful content and other 
content with the Google Preferred model that allows advertisers to pay a higher rate to advertise 
on the content of successful Youtube creators (Google 2016). The revenue sharing model has 
also been adopted in other platforms such as deviantArt’s ad service that generates revenue for 
the platform and content producers through the placement of advertisements by brands on the 
pages on content producers (deviantArt 2018) and its print shop which allows content creators to 
sell their art for a 20% profit of the selling cost (deviantArt 2018).  
These monetization methods have generated a new wave of content creators who them to 
continue creating content for their consumers for free while generating earnings from platforms. 
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However, even with these revenue sharing initiatives adopted by platforms, many of these low to 
mid-level content creators are struggling to generate profits (Blake 2017, Harbinger 2017). This 
is especially pronounced on platforms that requires the content creator to be an established 
partner before they are allowed to monetize their content. Examples of these platforms include 
Youtube (Youtube 2018) and SoundCloud, a platform for sharing music (SoundCloud 2018).  
With the rise of the consumer-creator profession as an industry mainstay, more content 
creators are participating and making content creation into careers. As such, financial 
compensation has become particularly important with calls within the industry to find ways to 
compensate content creators to ensure that content creation remains sustainable (Bhargava and 
Klat 2017, Ryan 2018). 
2 GROWTH OF THE RECURRING CONTRIBUTION MODEL 
The industry as a collective have responded with two separate models to increase the 
revenue generated by content creators – the subscription model and the patronage model. Both of 
these models are recurring models, with the subscription model driven largely through the 
platforms that host the content of creators and the Patronage model driven by funding from 
consumers of the content.  
2.1 PLATFORM-DRIVEN SUBSCRIPTION MODEL 
The Subscription Model charges consumers of the subscription service on a monthly 
basis. Consumers that subscribe for a digital content gains access to content or additional 
services. This model has been seen outside of our particular context and is similar to the 
subscription services for utilities such as phone bills (Danaher 2002) and for informational goods 
such as access to news and online databases (Fishburn and Odlyzko 1999, Jain and Kannan 
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2002). The subscription model is platform dependent as it is initiated by the platform that hosts 
the creators’ content. Content creators are passive adherents within the model as they have little 
influence on the terms of the subscription service. This model allows content creators to generate 
a consistent stream of revenue from subscribers of their channels every month. An example of 
this is the Twitch Partner Program on the Twitch platform. Twitch is live video streaming 
platform with over 15 million daily active users that allows content creators to stream videos 
(Twitch 2017). Although users are able to gain access to the content on Twitch, users can choose 
to pay to subscribe to channels and gain access to a subscriber only chat and several 
paraphernalia that can be used within the chat (Twitch 2018). The revenue generated from 
subscriptions will be split equally between the content creator and the platform, with each creator 
gaining a revenue stream equivalent to the number of people who subscribe to their content 
(Twitch 2017). 
2.2 CROWDFUNDING AND THE PATRONAGE MODEL 
In comparison, the patronage model gives the creator more control over the terms of the 
entire recurring funding process. The patronage Model depends on recurring crowdfunding. 
Crowdfunding, which is when many individuals contribute small amounts of funding in order to 
fund a project or a cause, allows content consumers to fund creators they support. This model is 
not driven by the platforms that host the creators’ content but by third party crowdfunding sites. 
Individuals involved in crowdfunding decide on the amount that they wish to contribute.  
There are several key differences in the established crowdfunding model and the 
patronage model. In an established crowdfunding model, the purpose of crowdfunding is to fund 
a project. Projects have a funding goal - a targeted amount of funds that they aim to collect 
within a fixed duration. A project is deemed successful only if the project manages to meet its 
40 
 
funding goal within the time period. After its funding duration, if the project was successfully 
funded, the amount pledged will be given to the creators who are then obliged to complete their 
project and deliver the rewards promised to contributors. We illustrate this with the Oculus Rift 
example (Kickstarter 2012). The Oculus Rift project was launched on 1st August 2012 and 
sought $250,000 to fund a Virtual Reality headset. The funding duration ended on 1st September 
2012, with the project receiving $2,437,429 from 9,522 backers. 
In comparison, the patronage model funds creators instead of individual projects. 
Contributors that fund a creator are effectively funding future content produced by the creator, 
becoming virtual patrons of the content creator. The structure of a Patronage model does not 
include a fixed duration, patrons can continuously fund a creator and can, at any time, stop 
funding at their own discretion. There is no measure of explicit success or failure in a Patronage 
model as there is no funding goal to reach. Funds will be deducted at set intervals from patrons. 
We illustrate this with the creator, Chapo Trap House (Chapo Trap House 2018). Chapo Trap 
House is a free weekly podcast on political humor created in March 2016. They adopted a 
patronage model in May 2016 to fund the costs of creating the podcast. As of March 2018, 
Chapo Trap House has 21,921 patrons providing $97,815 per month.  
Although, both the platform-driven subscription model and the patronage model are able 
to generate recurring revenue streams for content creators, there is an increasing shift towards the 
patronage model as this model is not platform specific and has more flexibility in 
implementation by content creators compared to the subscription model. Crowdfunding 
platforms have such as Patreon and Flattr have sprung up to allow content creators from different 
platforms to receive financial support from their content consumers. This model has become 
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increasingly mainstream that even Kickstarter, a platform synonymous to crowdfunding, has 
started their version of a patronage platform recently in December 2017 (Chen 2017). 
Although there has been research and industry consensus on the determinants of 
crowdfunding, there has been no research at this current point on recurring crowdfunding. Given 
the differences between crowdfunding for projects and crowdfunding for creators, we expect that 
drivers of crowdfunding success in the former may not hold true in the context of crowdfunding 
for creators.  
3 PATTERNS OF GROWTH IN THE RECURRING CROWDFUNDING PROCESS 
Previously, we have distinguished between crowdfunding for projects and crowdfunding 
for creators. The contrast between their purpose will drive differences in how contributors react. 
As crowdfunding a project has a fixed duration and goal, contributors that are funding the project 
will generally increase over time and will remain contributors until the project ends. As funds are 
generally not deducted if the project is unsuccessful, there is no loss for contributors if the 
project fails to meet its goal within the funding duration and thus they will remain as contributors 
until the end of the project. This results in an increasing funding crowdfunding pattern with 
contributors being more likely to contribute during the first and last weeks of the crowdfunding 
project with the last week serving as a motivator for potential contributors to fund the project 
either to receive the rewards associated with the project or to ensure that the project meets its 
goal before ending (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2018). 
However, crowdfunding patterns for crowdfunding creators are distinctly more 
heterogenous. The recurring nature of crowdfunding, along with a lack of a fixed goal and a 
fixed duration results in differences in the reaction of patrons. As there is no fixed duration, 
42 
 
patrons can choose to support creates at any time, similarly they can pull their funding at their 
own discretion as well. This results in patterns that can increase or decrease across time. The lack 
of a goal or a duration results in patrons receiving no motivators when they are required to 
contribute and as a result contribution patterns are less stable comparing to crowdfunding 
projects. We illustrate this with patterns of actual crowdfunding for projects and creators. [Insert 
Figure 7] 
3.1 MEASURES OF CROWDFUNDING PATTERNS 
Due to the large amount of heterogeneity between patterns of crowdfunding for creators, 
coupled with the unique nature of the recurring crowdfunding process, we are interested in 
identifying the factors that affect crowdfunding patterns across the recurring crowdfunding 
process.  
To achieve this, we first identify crowdfunding patterns that are of interest to creators and 
platforms. Crowdfunding research have often studied two key metrics of crowdfunding, the 
number of contributors of a crowdfunding project and the funding received by the crowdfunding 
project (Mollick 2014, Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). These two indicators, in conjunction with 
the funding goal, provide information on how successful the crowdfunding project is. In 
exploring the patterns of recurring crowdfunding, we use the same metrics as relevant outcomes 
of the recurring crowdfunding process. As such, our research objective will explore the patterns 
of change in the number of patrons and the patterns of change in the amount of contributions 
when crowdfunding a creator. 
Within these two metrics, there are two other methods of quantifying patterns of change. 
What we have discussed thus far relate to the change in magnitude of patrons or contributions. 
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For example, we are able to tell that from day 1 to day 10 of crowdfunding for a particular 
creator, the number of patrons increases from 1 to 100. However, we are not able to identify the 
dynamics behind how this change comes about. It is possible that the number of patrons 
undergoes a large change at the start, with a larger number of patrons funding the creator in the 
initial period. It is also equally possible that the number of patrons undergo a large change at the 
end, with a larger number of patrons funding the creator in the later period. The difference in 
possibilities will lead to different actions from the creator, with one creator treating the initial 
period of paramount importance in attracting patrons and the other creator choosing to focus 
their efforts on the later period. This information that is not supplied by the previous patron and 
contribution patterns but is provided by estimating the velocity of the patterns. Velocity of 
growth in patrons and contributions determines the change in the number of patrons and 
contributions across the time passed. With velocity, we are able to easily distinguish when a 
large change occurs. In our earlier example, the velocity of contribution patterns will be able to 
show that a large change occurs at the early periods in the first scenario with an increase in 
velocity at the earlier stages while the second scenario shows that the large change occurs at the 
later periods with an increase in velocity at later periods. Thus, velocity patterns will allow 
creators and platforms understand how patrons and contributions change over time.  
Another measure that captures a different aspect of how patterns evolve across time is 
acceleration. The rate at which the velocity of the patrons and contributions change is captured 
by acceleration. The growth of patrons can change at a constant rate, a slower rate or a faster 
rate. At a granular level, it informs the creator which period has the largest impact on velocity 
and directs creators to focus their efforts in those periods. For instance, in a scenario where there 
is increasing velocity at the early stages of the crowdfunding process, knowing whether the 
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velocity is increasing at an increasing rate, a stable rate or a decreasing rate will generate 
different responses from the creator. If velocity is increasing at an increasing rate, the creator 
will know that the factors that are responsible for the velocity increase gains momentum as time 
passes and as such is important throughout the entire velocity increase cycle. If velocity is 
increasing at a decreasing rate, the creator should acknowledge that the factors responsible for 
the velocity increase has the greatest traction at the start and can creators can divest attention and 
effort away from these factors after the initial velocity change has occurred. As changes in 
acceleration will change how creators understand how patrons and contributions change over 
time, it is an important dynamic that should be explored. 
We thus focus on two different metrics, the number of patrons and the funding amount 
received across all time periods in the recurring crowdfunding process, and three different 
dynamic representations of these two metrics. This comprises of the actual magnitude of the 
number of patrons and the funding amount received across time, the velocity of the change in the 
number of patrons and funding amount received across time and the acceleration of the change in 
the number of patrons and the funding amount received across time. These 6 patterns will serve 
as the dependent variables for our study.  
3.2 FACTORS THAT IMPACT CROWDFUNDING PATTERNS 
As the aim of our research is to identify factors that can impact the patterns of 
crowdfunding across the entire funding duration, we propose several variables that may 
influence patterns of growth. As this is a relatively new context, we use information freely 
available on the project page of the recurring crowdfunding projects. These variables are grouped 
into four broad categories in our research – Project Type, Nature of Incentives, Project 
Presentation Characteristics and Project Category. 
45 
 
Project Type 
Project Type outlines the properties of the crowdfunding project. These variables include 
the type of crowdfunding imposed by the project creator and the explicitness of content. In our 
study’s recurring crowdfunding context, the project creator is free to specify whether they are 
collecting funding on a per item basis (item focused projects) or over a set duration (duration 
focused projects). For projects that are item focused, funds will be deducted from patrons 
whenever the creator produces an item. Depending on the project type, items can range from 
videos (Pentatonix 2018) to comics (Revoy 2018) to even art pieces (Mullins 2018). For projects 
that are duration focused, funds will be deducted after every month akin to a subscription service 
(Chapo Trap House 2018). The choice of crowdfunding type governs how patrons interact 
financially with the creator and may have an impact on the growth of crowdfunding patterns.  
The explicitness of the content captures the type of content that the creator produces. 
Content is considered explicit if it deals with sensitive material, offensive material or 
pornographic material. In mainstream crowdfunding platforms, such as Kickstarter and 
Indiegogo, policies are in place to remove these types of projects (Indiegogo 2018, Kickstarter 
2018). In comparison, the patronage model funds creators and does not discriminate between the 
content funding. As such, the flexibility of the recurring crowdfunding platforms has allowed 
many fringe creators with niche target segments access to crowdfunding. The explicit nature of 
content may motivate interested patrons to fund creators at certain stages of the crowdfunding 
process, due to the sensationalist nature of such content, or the difference the content makes in 
motivating patrons to continue funding the project is of interest to us. 
Nature of Incentives 
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There has been evidence that rewards in crowdfunding do drive contributor support, with 
increasing number of rewards in crowdfunding projects linked to an increase in the number of 
contributors (Kuppuswamy and Bayus 2017). Although the context of our research is different, 
we believe that incentives will have an impact on crowdfunding patterns for patronage models. 
We observe four different forms of incentives – the number of perks, the number of free content, 
the number of exclusive content and the percentage of exclusive content created.  
Project creators adopt a patronage model in order to fund their content creation process. 
The content they create can continue to be accessed for free. However, in adopting this model, 
creators can offer patrons incentives to fund them. This may take the form of perks based off the 
amount they contribute to the project. Some perks are intangible benefits such as having their 
names featured in the end credits of videos or early access to content (Pentatonix 2018, Revoy 
2018). Some perks however are tangible, such as a promised artwork every period (Chan 2018). 
Although the perks offered on Patreon may not be as substantive as those on other crowdfunding 
sites such as Kickstarter, they may still have an effect on contribution amounts similar to the 
effects documented in previous research (Kuppuswamy & Bayus 2017).  
Another incentive that may motivate patrons to continue funding the creator is the 
number of free content provided by the creator. As the creator continues to produce content, they 
can choose to release the content for free on the platform their content originates from as well as 
sharing the content on the crowdfunding site. The magnitude of free content may motivate 
patrons to fund the creator as a reciprocal effort to reward the creator for producing more content 
for the community and serves as an incentive for increasing number of patrons and contributions. 
The free content provides information that may influence potential patrons in their decision on 
whether to contribute to the crowdfunding project.  
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The number of exclusive content produced by the content creator also serve as an 
incentive that can motivate patrons to fund the creator. Aside from free content, the content 
creator is able to share exclusive content on the crowdfunding site as well. The exclusive content 
can only be viewed by pre-existing patrons and can range from early access to free content to 
additional content that is exclusive only to patrons who fund them such as behind the scenes 
content or content specially prepared for patrons.  
A further factor that may serve as an incentive for patrons to fund the creator is the 
percentage of exclusive content created. A larger proportion of exclusive content compared to 
free content produced will indicate that the creator has a higher predisposition to offer benefits to 
their patrons rather than sharing more content with the public. This focus offers a deeper insight 
to the priorities of the creator that mere magnitude of free and exclusive content is unable to 
provide. A creator that has a higher focus on exclusive content may impact crowdfunding 
patterns in a different way compared to a creator with a focus on free content. We address how 
these incentives impact crowdfunding patterns at different stages of the crowdfunding process in 
our analysis. 
Project Presentation Characteristics 
In the project page, the platform requires the project creator to provide a brief 
introduction to potential backers on their work. The project presentation characteristics found 
within this page may have an impact on crowdfunding patterns. Previous research on 
crowdfunding has shown that the presence of a video in the project description have a positive 
impact on crowdfunding (Mollick 2014). This can be attributed to the fact that a video is a source 
of information for the potential backer. As such, a potential backer would have more details on 
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the project thus increasing their confidence that the project has been thoroughly thought out. The 
video also allows creators to personally appeal to potential backers which may increase the 
likelihood of potential backers contributing. We explore the impact a video has across the entire 
recurring crowdfunding process.  
Previous research on crowdfunding has also shown that the number of words in the 
project description has been shown to have a positive effect in crowdfunding (Marom and Sade 
2013). The effect arises from the information provided in a longer project description. Similarly, 
we expect that a longer project description will impact on our recurring crowdfunding project 
compared to a short one. We include the number of words in our model to identify at which stage 
will the length of the project description have an impact over the course of the recurring 
crowdfunding process.  
The second observable factor within the presentation of the project is the presence of 
formatting in the project description. Project descriptions that are not formatted tend to comprise 
of large paragraphs with no headings or sub-headings. Visually, these project descriptions are 
messy, and the words are harder to parse. This lead to lower processing fluency, which has been 
shown to have a negative effect on motivation (Song and Schwarz 2008). We expect that a 
properly formatted project description, with headings and sub-headings, with important parts 
highlighted will affect crowdfunding patterns compared to a project description with no 
formatting. 
The project presentation also informs potential patrons of any milestone goals the creator 
has. Milestone goals are promises made by the creator to their content consumers. If the creator 
reaches a certain level of funding, passing the goal amount listed by the milestone, the creator is 
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obligated to fulfil the promises in the goal. An example of milestone goals are promises to start 
give away contests after a certain contribution level or to start doing different forms of content 
(Chan 2018). These milestone goals may serve as targets for patrons to strive to reach so that the 
community will be able to receive the promised benefit in the milestone itself. This will in turn 
will have an impact on patterns of growth for patrons and contributions. 
Another project presentation characteristic that may have an impact on crowdfunding 
patterns is the presence of a sample. As we have discussed earlier, a recurring crowdfunding 
model seeks to fund the creator and their future creations and not a specific project. As such, the 
creator will have a portfolio of previous creations which can serve as samples to allow potential 
patrons a preview of the types of future content they can expect. Potential backers can evaluate 
the form of content, the quality of the content and other noticeable measures that can serve as the 
basis of their judgement before making their contribution decision.  
The final information on the project presentation that may impact patterns of growth in 
patrons and contributions is the number of platforms listed on the page itself. Creators can 
include links within the project description page that allow potential patrons to access the content 
hosting platform that houses their content and other platforms that they use to interact with 
consumers of the content. Listed platforms can include content hosting platforms such as 
Youtube and deviantArt, media platforms such as Twitter and even personal platforms such as 
blogs and personal webpages. The number of platforms allow patrons access to the project 
creator as well as serve as a testament to their content quality as potential patrons can access the 
hosting platform to view previous content by the creator. These components of the project 
presentation may have differing impacts on different stages the recurring crowdfunding process 
and are easily observable from the project page itself, hence we include them in our model. 
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Project Category 
The last group of variables that we study are project category variables. The content 
produced by creators fall under a wide range of categories. They can be separated in eight 
distinct categories. They include Writing, Video, Games, Podcasts, Music, Comics, Photo and 
Animation. We list the following types of content that can be classified under each category. 
Content that primarily focus on writing, such as reviews, blog posts, fictional stories can be 
classified under Writing. Content produced under the Video category include videos made by 
Youtube creators and live-stream videos by Twitch streamers. Gaming content mainly 
encompasses creators that create video or table-top games. Content under the podcast category 
deals with episodic series of audio broadcasts. Music content includes original music and music 
covers. The category of comics includes comics and drawings such as sketches and comic series. 
Photography content takes the form of photographic art or content on photo sharing sites such as 
Instagram. Animation is primarily focused on animated gifs, picture or shorts. We include these 
to measure whether the nature of the content can drive growth in patrons and contribution across 
the entire recurring crowdfunding process. 
4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
Our research objective is to identify the independent variables that can impact the 
patterns of growth across different periods of the crowdfunding process. We will use variables 
relating to Project Type, Nature of Incentives, Project Presentation Characteristics and Project 
Categories and establish how these variables will impact the number of patrons and the funding 
amount received and their respective velocity and acceleration changes across time. Below is a 
figure of our model. [Insert Figure 8] 
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The flow of our research will be as follows: We will first collect the data required by 
gathering the patron and contribution data from recurring crowdfunding projects. Then we will 
access their project pages to code our independent variables from information provided in the 
project description. We then set up our data by configuring the data to obtain curves that show 
the change in the number of patrons and contributions as well as their respective velocity and 
acceleration curves. We then prepare our data for analysis by smoothing the curves for use 
before finally performing functional data analyses with our curves as dependent variables and 
with our previously gathered independent variables.   
5 DATA AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
The data used in the study is data collected from Patreon, the largest recurring funding 
crowdfunding platform. Content creators can create a page on Patreon allowing consumers of 
their content to support them financially by becoming patrons and contributing funds. Creators 
have full control of whether they decide to collect funds for each content produced or after a 
certain period has passed such as on a per month basis. Funds will be automatically deducted 
from patrons with approximately 90% of the funds collecting going to the creator and 
approximately 10% serving as Patreon’s and other third party’s administrative fees (Patreon 
2017). Consumers can choose to support the creator with a contribution of any given amount. 
However, even if they do not choose to contribute, they are still able to enjoy content provided 
by the content creator for free (Owens 2017). There are currently over 3.7 million pledges for 
recurring contributions on Patreon, with a total estimated monthly payout of over $11 million 
(Graphtreon 2018), with content creators such as Chapo Trap House earning over $96,000 per 
month from over 21,000 patrons (Chapo Trap House 2018). 
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We collected data on 3229 projects that were launched between June 2014 and May 
2015. Data relating to each Patreon project, its description and other unique project 
characteristics are coded by entering the Patreon page and coding the information available. As 
we are interested in analysing the patterns of growth for patrons and contributions, we collect 
longitudinal data on the patrons and the funding the project receives over a period of 300 days. 
Our data has 288,830 maximum patrons in a day, with duration focused projects earning 
$1,367,818 per month and item focused projects earning $351,526 per item in total.  
5.1 DEPENDENT MEASURES 
We have compiled patron and contribution data from a third-party platform, Graphtreon. 
At we are interested in the patterns of change in our dependent measures, we collect longitudinal 
data on our variables of interest over a period of 300 days. These 300 days represent the first 300 
days of a Patreon project’s lifespan. As we are able to observe the entire change of patron and 
contributions over the entire time period, we form curves that represent how the number of 
patrons and contributions change over time. 
Patron Curves. This curve represents the change in the number of patrons across the first 
300 days of a project’s lifespan. Patreon projects have an indicator that captures the number of 
patrons currently funding the project at any given time. Data on this indicator is taken daily and 
the subsequent curve formed by the aggregation of the data across 300 days serve as our patron 
curve for each individual project. 
Velocity of Patron Curves. The velocity of patron curves captures the rate at which the 
patron curve changes. We obtain the velocity of patron curves by taking the first order 
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differential of patron curves for each individual project (Ramsay et al. 2009). The resulting curve 
allow us to observe the changes in the velocity of the patron curves across time.  
Acceleration of Patron Curves. The acceleration of patron curves captures the rate at 
which velocity changes. We obtain the acceleration of patron curves by taking the second order 
differential of patron curves for each individual project (Ramsay et al. 2009). The resulting curve 
allow us to observe the changes in the acceleration of the patron curves across time.  
Contribution Curves. This curve represents the change in the amount of contribution 
across the first 300 days of a project’s lifespan. Patreon projects have an indicator that captures 
the amount of contributions the project has at any given time. Data on this indicator is taken 
daily and the subsequent curve formed by the aggregation of the data across 300 days serve as 
our contribution curve for each individual project. 
Velocity of Contribution Curves. The velocity of contribution curves captures the rate at 
which the contribution curve changes. We obtain the velocity of contribution curves by taking 
the first order differential of contribution curves for each individual project (Ramsay et al. 2009). 
The resulting curve allow us to observe the changes in the velocity of the contribution curves 
across time. 
Acceleration of Contribution Curves. The acceleration of contribution curves captures the 
rate at which velocity changes. We obtain the acceleration of contribution curves by taking the 
second order differential of contribution curves for each individual project (Ramsay et al. 2009). 
The resulting curve allow us to observe the changes in the acceleration of the contribution curves 
across time.  
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5.2 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
To explore the factors that may have a potential effect on patterns of recurring 
crowdfunding and its dynamics, we collect data on several independent variables that we expect 
would have an impact. 
Project Type 
Crowdfunding type. This binary variable indicates if the crowdfunding project is an item 
focused project (funds are collected per item) or a duration focused crowdfunding model (funds 
are collected per month). This is indicated within the crowdfunding page, with duration focused 
projects as 0 and item focused projects as 1. 
Explicit Content. This variable indicates whether the crowdfunding project contains 
explicit material such as sensitive material or material related to violence or pornography. The 
content produced by the creator is coded to reflect whether the content is explicit or not, with 
non-explicit content as 0 and explicit content as 1. 
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks. The number of perks offered to patrons by the project creator. This variable 
is available within the crowdfunding page.  
No. of Free Content. The number of free content available at the moment of data 
collection. This information is taken from the number of content posts tagged as public in the 
crowdfunding page. 
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No. of Exclusive Content. The number of exclusive content at the moment of data 
collection. This information is taken from the number of content posts tagged as patron only in 
the crowdfunding page. 
Percentage of Exclusive Content Created. The proportion of exclusive content out of all 
content produced by the creator. This variable is the number of exclusive content the creator has 
produced relative to all the content the creator has produced. It indicates the predisposition of the 
content creator in offering more benefits to their patrons compared to the general content 
consumer.  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video. Video captures whether the crowdfunding project page has a video and is taken 
from the project description page, with projects that have no video as 0 and projects with video 
as 1. 
No. of Words. The number of words used in the project description.  
Format. This variable capture whether formatting is present in the project description of 
the Patreon project. Projects that have proper sub-headings for different segments of the project 
description, using bold or italics to highlight certain important portions or color to organize 
information in the project description or considered formatted projects, with non-formatted 
projects as 0 and formatted projects as 1. 
No. of Goals. The number of milestone goals a Patreon project has. This is available in 
the main page of the crowdfunding project. 
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Sample. Sample denotes whether a specimen of the content is provided in the 
crowdfunding project page, with projects that have no sample as 0 and projects with a sample 
provided as 1. This is coded from the project description page. 
No. of Platforms. The number of other platforms listed in the description page of a 
Patreon project. This is taken by coding the links to the number of other platforms that appears 
throughout the entire project description page. 
Project Category 
Writing Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the writing 
category. 
Video Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the video 
category. 
Games Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the game design 
and creation category. 
Podcast Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the podcast or 
audio broadcast category. 
Music Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the music 
category. 
Comics Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the comics or 
drawing category. 
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Photography Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the 
photographic art category. 
Animation Category. The content created by the creator primarily belongs to the 
animation category. 
The descriptive statistics for our independent variables can be found in the table below. 
Notably, the number of duration focused projects is three times larger than the number of item 
focused projects, with creators showing a preference in collecting their funds on a monthly basis. 
[Insert Table 8] 
6 MODEL FORMULATION AND ESTIMATION 
Our interest in the growth and changes of crowdfunding patterns requires us to use 
methods that are able to model funding dynamics and determine the relationship of relevant 
variables on the funding process. We use the tools provided by functional data analysis to 
address these issues. 
Functional Data Analysis is a statistical method used to analyse curves. It has three key 
areas that make it appropriate to use for our current research.  
First, we are interested in exploring the dynamics behind our current data, which is highly 
heterogenous and distinctly non-linear. Other econometric methods focus on data points and may 
not be able to capture the dynamics behind the curves. Functional Data Analysis uses the curves 
as the core of its analysis and provides empirical results based off the dynamics of the curve 
(Reddy and Dass 2006). Using this method, we are able to consider the curves of our 
crowdfunding patterns as dependent variables. 
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Second, functional data analysis can capture nuances in relationships between the 
variables and the curves across time. Certain variables may only have an impact on the functions 
at different times. Functional data analysis is able to account for these time-varying relationships 
unequivocally (Dass and Shropshire 2012).  
Third, results from functional data analysis have been shown to be able to predict future 
trajectories of growth for new curves based off analysis of existing curves. This is especially so 
in dynamic environments (Dass and Shropshire 2012). Data from new products penetration has 
shown that functional data analysis is able to perform accurate predictions with only principal 
component scores of existing similar products (Sood et al. 2009). As one of our main concerns in 
this research is to allow new entrants in Patreon to predict how their project will do as well as to 
highlight important project characteristics that will affect their project contribution patterns, we 
find that this method will be able to address our concerns in a satisfactory manner.  
6.1 DATA CONFIGURATION 
To perform our analyses, we first need to set up our data to ensure that we will be able to 
run our subsequent analyses. We have obtained daily data on the number of patrons that are 
contributing to projects as well as the contribution amounts of projects for first 300 days of the 
project’s lifespan ( 𝑌𝑖,𝑡=1 … 𝑌𝑖, 𝑡=300). We have a total of 3229 curves for both dependent 
variables ( 𝑌1,𝑡 … 𝑌3229,𝑡). To consider all curves jointly in our analysis, we configure the data 
into a matrix with the form: 
𝑦(𝑡) = [
𝑦1, 𝑡=1 𝑦1, 𝑡=2
𝑦2, 𝑡=1 …
… 𝑦1, 𝑡=300
… 𝑦2, 𝑡=300
⋮ …
𝑦3229, 𝑡=1 …
… ⋮
… 𝑦3229, 𝑡=300
] 
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We form 2 matrix that encompasses the patron and contribution curves of the 3229 
projects in our data set. As we are also interested in the velocity and acceleration of patron and 
contribution curves we take the first order differential and second order differential of these 3229 
curves and further form the matrix for velocity,  𝑦′(𝑡), and acceleration, 𝑦′′(𝑡). 
We form a similar matrix set that groups the independent variables together: 
𝑋𝑇 = [
𝑋1,𝑡=1 𝑋2,𝑡=1
⋮ ⋮
𝑋1,𝑡=300 …
… ⋯
⋮ ⋮
… …
⋯ 𝑋20,𝑡=1
⋮ ⋮
… 𝑋20,𝑡=300
] 
with X comprising of all 20 independent variables listed earlier. Once the variables are prepared, 
we proceed to reduce the noise within the curves in preparation for our analysis.  
6.2 SMOOTHING THE CURVES 
Curves formed from raw data tend to be noisy, with many spikes throughout the entirety 
of the curve. We are interested in the patterns of the curves and as such require a way to remove 
this random noise in order to distinguish the patterns of the curves. To achieve this, we use a 
method called smoothing (Ramsey and Silverman 2005). 
We scale our temporal data between 0 and 1, with 0 being the day the Patreon project 
launched and 1 being the 300th day of our dataset. This is done to align all curves since our data 
ranges from June 2014 to May 2015 with projects varying in start date. This would also increase 
the ease of smoothing the curves as we now split the curves into 100 equal portions known as 
knots (Reddy and Dass 2006). The curve within each portion is then smoothed by fitting a basis 
spline, a piecewise polynomial that will generate a polynomial functional form as per 
convention. This form is more flexible as it does not impose any restrictions and can account for 
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different functional forms (Ramsey and Silverman 2005). In order to prevent overfitting of the 
curves, we specify a smoothing parameter with a roughness penalty. This roughness penalty 
avoids overfitting of the data by trading off curve roughness at the expense of lack of data fit 
(Ramsay et al. 2009).  
We impose a roughness penalty function (PEN) with the aim of identifying a function 
that minimizes the penalized residual sum of squares (PENSS) (Reddy and Dass 2006): 
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑚 = ∫[𝐷
𝑚𝑓(𝑡)]2 𝑑𝑡 
𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑆𝜆,𝑚
(𝑗)
= ∑(𝑦𝑖
(𝑗)
− 𝑓(𝑗)(𝑡𝑖))
2
𝑛
+ 𝜆𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑚
(𝑗)
 
where 𝐷𝑚𝑓 is the mth derivative of function f, 𝜆 represents the smoothing parameter, 𝑦𝑖
(𝑗)
 
represents the observed data for each Patreon project and 𝑓(𝑗)(𝑡𝑖) denotes the functional value 
obtained from the smoothed spline.  
We implement this to smooth the curves for both the number of patrons across time, the 
amount of contributions across time as well as the smoothed curves for the velocity and 
acceleration of patron and contribution curves.  
6.3 FUNCTIONAL REGRESSION 
Our main goal of this paper is to explore how different project characteristics will impact 
our dependent variables – patron and contributions curves along with their respective velocity 
and acceleration. Using the previously prepared data, we are able to run a regression to identify 
how our independent variables impact patterns of crowdfunding at different stages of the 
crowdfunding process. We use functional regression where: 
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𝑦(𝑡) = 𝑋𝑇𝛽(𝑡) + 𝜀(𝑡) 
with 𝛽(𝑡) reflecting the varying effects of independent variables at varying stages of our 
crowdfunding process (Wang et al. 2008).  
The model we use for determining how project characteristics will impact recurring 
contributions is separated into a model for item focused projects and duration focused projects. 
Item focused projects will provide us data on the contribution per item while duration focused 
projects provide a different form of data - their contributions per month. Given that these 
parameters are distinctly dissimilar, we need to separate them out before estimating the effect of 
project characteristics on recurring contributions. As such, we consider both types of projects 
separately in our estimation of patterns of change in contribution amount. 
7 RESULTS 
Figure 9 shows the results of smoothing the patron functions and their respective velocity 
and acceleration functions. The smoothed curves will be used for our subsequent analysis. We 
compute the average smoothed curves to illustrate how the patterns change. We interpret the 
decrease in velocity and deceleration to be when the curve moves towards the 0 and an increase 
in velocity and acceleration to be when the curve moves away from 0. We can see that projects 
tend to increase in patrons over time, with a decreasing velocity that increases slightly in the mid 
stages of crowdfunding process and a deceleration that stops briefly at the mid stages of the 
crowdfunding process before a period of increasing acceleration that stabilizes at the later stages 
of the crowdfunding process. [Insert Figure 9] 
As contributions from item focused projects and duration focused projects are not 
comparable, we smooth them within their crowdfunding type. Comparing the average patterns of 
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both curves, we see a contrast between how patterns of contributions for both crowdfunding 
types evolve across time. We notice that contributions for item focused projects decreases 
sharply towards the later stages of the crowdfunding process. Although the pattern of decrease is 
also observed for contributions of duration focused projects, the pattern is not that sharp. 
Contributions for item focused projects have a decreasing velocity that stabilizes in the mid 
stages of the crowdfunding process before increasing in velocity for the rest of the process. This 
is reflected in their acceleration, which shows deceleration up to the mid stages of the 
crowdfunding process before entering a state of increasing acceleration. For duration focused 
projects, we observe a sharp decrease in velocity in the early stages of the crowdfunding process 
before increasing slightly at the mid stages followed by an increasing velocity at the later stages. 
The acceleration of the duration focused project decelerates in the early stages before stabilizing. 
After stabilization, the contributions go through a period of increasing acceleration before 
decelerating again. The contrast between the patterns of these two crowdfunding types are 
distinct and thus should be considered separately in later analysis on contributions. [Insert Figure 
10 & 11] 
We inspect the correlation of our variables before continuing with our analysis. Our 
model does not suffer from multicollinearity issues [Insert Table 9] 
We run a regression on our proposed model and obtain the coefficients of the 
independent variables across the entire crowdfunding process. These coefficients take the form 
of a curve with an example shown in Figure 12. To interpret the curve, we note that curves with 
the confidence bands above or below the 0 would mean that the variable has a significant impact 
on our dependent variable for that particular time period. [Insert Figure 12] 
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7.1 IMPACT OF FACTORS ON PATTERNS OF PATRON GROWTH 
We show the results of our analysis for the pattern of the patrons in Table 10. Incentives 
seem to factor is as important variables in affecting the number of patrons, with number of perks, 
number of free content, number of exclusive content and percentage of exclusive content all 
having positive significant effects on the entire patron curve. However, these incentive variables 
have differing impacts on the velocity and acceleration curves of patrons. Although all these 
variables have an impact on the velocity of the change in the number of patrons, the effect of the 
number of exclusive content lasts the longest, affecting the velocity from the initial 
crowdfunding stages all the way to the end of the mid stages of crowdfunding. The number of 
perks has the shortest impact on velocity, lasting up to the first 120 days, with the number of free 
content and the percentage of exclusive content lasting longer. We note that aside from 
percentage of exclusive content, the other incentive variables all have a negative impact on 
acceleration, with number of perks and free content impact extending from the initial stages to 
the mid stages of the crowdfunding process while the number of exclusive content only having 
an impact from the period between the 150th to the 195th day. With this we can conclude that 
incentives in general will have a positive impact on patron growth as well as the rate of patron 
growth. As such, creators should offer more perks, more free content and more exclusive content 
in order to attract patrons. In particular, creators need to ensure that the amount of exclusive 
content they offer is more than the amount of free content as patrons are sensitive to this 
throughout the entire crowdfunding process. [Insert Table 10] 
Characteristics of Project Presentation also have an impact on the growth of the number 
of patrons. One notable variable that impact the patron curves is the number of words, which has 
a positive impact on patrons throughout the entire crowdfunding process, a positive impact on 
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velocity in the mid stages of crowdfunding, and an impact on acceleration at the late stages of 
crowdfunding. We do see a negative impact of number of milestone goals on patrons from the 
initial stages of crowdfunding up to the 165th day, this along with a negative impact on 
acceleration at the later stages of the crowdfunding process shows that creators should not have 
too many milestone goals as it will decrease the number of patrons at the early stages of 
crowdfunding.  
We also identify categories that are able to attract patrons throughout the entire 
crowdfunding process. Content from the Video, Games and Podcast categories have a positive 
impact on the number of patrons across the entire crowdfunding process. This is especially 
notable for Video and Podcast content as they have a positive impact on velocity as well.  
7.2 IMPACT OF FACTORS ON PATTERNS OF CONTRIBUTION GROWTH FOR 
ITEM FOCUSED PROJECTS 
Unlike the results that we have obtained for patron growth, contribution growth for item 
focused projects are dissimilar. The most important distinction is the fact that free content and 
the percentage of exclusive content do not have a significant impact on contribution growth. An 
increase in the number of perks has a positive impact on contributions throughout the 
crowdfunding process. The number of perks also has a positive impact in the initial stages and a 
negative impact in the later stages, with a negative impact on acceleration from the mid to late 
stages. Furthermore, the number of exclusive content has a positive impact on contributions 
across the entire crowdfunding process, with a positive impact on velocity in the initial to mid 
stages of crowdfunding and a positive impact on acceleration in the initial stages but a negative 
impact on acceleration at the mid to late stages of crowdfunding. Put together, this suggests that 
65 
 
more perks and exclusive content will increase contributions, however, the rate of increase starts 
to slow down at the later stages of crowdfunding. [Insert Table 11] 
Other notable variables that impact contributions are the number of words and that the 
content produced is from the video category. We observe a positive impact of the number of 
words throughout the entire crowdfunding process, signalling that the more words in the project 
description, the more contributions will grow, especially in the early stages and later stages of 
crowdfunding since they also have a positive impact on acceleration in the first 30 days and the 
last 45 days. We also observe a positive impact of video content after the first 30 days and this 
impact will last for the rest of the crowdfunding process. Velocity is also affected by video 
content, with a positive impact during the mid stages of crowdfunding.  
7.3 IMPACT OF FACTORS ON PATTERNS OF CONTRIBUTION GROWTH FOR 
DURATION FOCUSED PROJECTS 
Contribution growth for duration focused projects are mainly driven by incentives and 
specific categories. [Insert Table 12] 
Similar to factors that impact patrons, factors that impact contributions for duration 
focused projects comprise of all forms of incentives. The effect of all these incentives last 
through the entire crowdfunding process. However, these incentives have different impact on the 
velocity of contributions, with the number of perks having a positive impact on velocity at the 
early and late stages of crowdfunding, the percentage of exclusive content having an impact in 
the first 75 days, the amount of free content having an impact on the first 120 days and the 
number of exclusive content having an impact in the mid stages of the crowdfunding process. 
The number of free content also has a negative impact on acceleration over the first half of the 
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crowdfunding process with perks having a negative impact on acceleration between the 60th to 
150th day and a positive impact on acceleration from the 225th day onwards. Put together, this 
suggests that although all these forms of incentives increase contributions, content creators 
should focus generating free content up to the first 120th day. After that, content creators should 
focus less on free content as its impact on the velocity at which contribution grow is non-
significant after that period. Creators should continue to focus on exclusive content and perks as 
these will have a positive impact the velocity at the mid stages for the former and the velocity 
and acceleration at the late stages of crowdfunding for the latter. 
We note that content produced in the categories of videos, games and podcasts have a 
positive impact on contribution growth, with podcasts having a positive impact on the velocity of 
contribution growth in the mid stages of the crowdfunding process as well. 
The results obtained from the impact of different factors on the growth of patron and 
contributions suggest that different factors will have disparate effects at different stages of the 
crowdfunding process. Knowing the impact these variables have on patterns of crowdfunding is 
important in aiding us understand the crowdfunding process. Certain variables such as free 
content may have an impact on patron growth and contributions for duration focused projects, 
will not influence contributions for item focused projects. Similarly, knowing that variables have 
an impact in different stages such as the significant impact on free content on velocity in the 
early stages of contributions for duration focused projects will give content creators a guideline 
on which factors to emphasize at different stages of the crowdfunding process in order to 
maximize revenue. 
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8 FUNCTIONAL CLUSTERING  
In our previous analysis, we considered curves at an aggregate level, with all curves 
being considered for our regression. With this, we question whether certain patterns that could be 
observed by smaller groups of homogenous curves are meaningful for creators and platforms to 
consider. The heterogeneity of the large number of curves will obscure patterns between more 
homogenous groups of curves and to uncover these potentially meaningful patterns, we conduct 
a principal component analysis and clustering of our aggregate curves. 
Instead of considering a set of discrete values, our principal component analysis 
considers a set of curves to identify the significant primary modes of variation available in the 
patterns (Ramsey et al. 2009). Our principal component scores are calculated as such: 
𝑆𝑖𝑝 = ∫ 𝑒𝑝(𝑠) 𝑧𝑖(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 
where 𝑆𝑖𝑝 is the score for each of the p principal components, with 𝑒𝑝(𝑠) representing a set of p 
principal component curves with 𝑧𝑖(𝑠) representing the set of smoothed curves (Dass and 
Shropshire 2012).  
We can further classify curves based on their structure by grouping similar curves 
together through clustering the curves (James and Sugar 2003). We use the k-means clustering to 
minimize the within-cluster sum of squares:  
arg 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ ∑ ‖𝑧𝑗(𝑠) − 𝜇𝑖‖
2
𝑧(𝑠)𝑗∈𝐻𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
where we cluster a set of 𝑛 response curves 𝑧𝑛(𝑠) by partitioning them into 𝑘sets of 𝐻 =
{ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑘} (Dass and Shropshire 2012).  
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The results of our principal components analysis and clustering are shown below. [Insert 
Figure 13] 
We are able to identify the three functional components within the different patterns of 
each curve. Further, using the elbows of the scree plots, we are able to identify the appropriate 
number of clusters for the curves of the number of patrons, contributions for item focused 
projects and contributions for duration focused projects. Based off their aggregated project 
categories and the type of content and creators, we have developed an initial cluster description 
for each of these clusters. [Insert Table 13] 
We have identified four clusters after minimizing for within-cluster heterogeneity for 
patterns in patron growth, five clusters for patterns of contributions for item focused projects and 
four clusters for patterns of contributions for duration focused projects.  
Clusters vary in size and there are some smaller clusters that can be described based off 
their content. Projects that have been identified as having similar patterns and comprising of 
large popular creators and are seen as extremely well performing projects are termed Established 
Projects. Another group of projects have been identified based on their content to be hedonic 
projects as they focus on projects that consumers can derive enjoyment from such as videos of 
creators sailing the world.  
For larger clusters, we tend to identify them based off the content categories of projects 
within the cluster. Projects with a heavy emphasis on sound, such as groups comprising of a 
majority of video, podcast or music content are termed as audio heavy projects. Projects grouped 
together that have a strong emphasis on what consumers view, with content generally in the 
video and comics category are termed visual heavy projects. Content that have a heavy emphasis 
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on the video category, we term as video heavy projects and the bulk of the projects will be 
grouped under generic projects. 
8.1 IMPACT OF FACTORS ON PATTERNS OF PATRON GROWTH FOR 
DIFFERENT CLUSTERS 
We compare the average curves of different patron clusters. We can observe that clusters 
have different patterns of patron growth, velocity and acceleration. This is especially true of 
Cluster A3 as acceleration of patron growth decelerates once more at the later stages after 
decelerating once at the early stages of the crowdfunding process while cluster A2 and A3 have 
no deceleration at later stages. The distinct differences in the patterns of curves lead us to 
conclude that splitting them into small homogenous clusters will give us more accurate results 
when we try to examine the factors that may impact patterns of contributions. [Insert Figure 14] 
After clustering the groups, we go through the same process in order to obtain results for 
our analysis of factors that affect patron patterns. As there are too few projects in Cluster A1, we 
were not able to obtain coefficients for the factors within the cluster due to the small sample size. 
We proceed to report the results of the follow three clusters. 
In Cluster A1, we observe several interesting differences from the aggregated results we 
presented earlier. For instance, explicit content has a negative impact on the number of patrons 
throughout the entire crowdfunding process. This would suggest that creators should avoid 
creating content that is not safe for all ages. Furthermore, the number of free content has a 
negative impact on patrons in the first 30 days while the number of exclusive content has a 
positive impact on patrons in the last 45 days. This result suggest that creators should not 
produce free content at the start of the project and need to have a sizable amount of exclusive 
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content by the late stages of the project in order to generate more patron growth. The positive 
impact of formatting on patron growth at the first 30 days and its related negative impact on 
velocity in the first 45 days suggest that the project description page needs to be properly 
formatted in order to attract patrons and this effect slowly decreases until the 45th day. We also 
note that the number of platforms have a negative impact on patrons from the mid stages of the 
crowdfunding process all the way to the end but this is attenuated by negative velocity and 
positive acceleration at the end. This suggests that including too many links to other platforms 
will decrease patrons, but this problem is lessened towards the end of the crowdfunding period as 
the rate of decrease slows down at an increasing pace. [Insert Table 14] 
In Cluster A3, the most meaningful factor is the number of free content. We find that the 
number of free content has a positive impact on the first 135 days in the crowdfunding project’s 
lifespan. This implies that in order to stimulate patron growth, creators for visual heavy projects 
should focus on creating more free content at the start of the project. [Insert Table 15] 
In Cluster A4, we find that incentives and different project presentation characteristics 
have an impact on patron growth. A summary of the results would indicate that creators should 
focus on having more perks, more free content, more exclusive content, a higher percentage of 
exclusive content compared to free content, more words in the project description and a sample 
within the project description through the entire crowdfunding process. This is especially the 
case for perks as it is the only variable that has a positive effect on late stage velocity as well as a 
positive effect on acceleration for the first 270 days. Creators can also leverage on the fact that 
explicit content has an impact after the initial stages and this positive impact lasts all the way to 
the end of the crowdfunding period. Creators should avoid listing too many platforms in their 
project page as it has a negative impact across the entire crowdfunding period. Results from this 
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generic cluster are markedly different from results provided by the aggregate group of patron 
curves earlier and as such may allow for more specific recommendations and more accurate 
results after accounting for heterogeneity in curves. [Insert Table 16] 
8.2 IMPACT OF FACTORS ON PATTERNS OF CONTRIBUTION GROWTH FOR 
ITEM FOCUSED PROJECTS IN DIFFERENT CLUSTERS 
Similar to what we expect, we see that the clusters have different patterns. For instance, 
previously when considering these curves as an aggregated group, the pattern of change for 
contributions, its velocity and its acceleration is most similar to our current Cluster B2. However, 
comparing Cluster B2 to our largest cluster, B4, we observe that the patterns of growth for 
contributions are different. Projects in B4 can be seen as less successful projects as they start off 
with a small peak before decreasing with a slight increase close to the later stages of the 
crowdfunding process before finally decreasing again. B2 however has a general increasing 
trend, with a peak at the later stages before slightly decreasing close to the end of our time 
period. [Insert Figure 15] 
For the groups of projects subdivided into different clusters, we find that Clusters B1 and 
B3 have small samples and as such are unable to estimate the coefficients of our independent 
variables. On the other hand, Cluster B5 has no significant variables, which might mean that 
there are other variables that we have not accounted for that may be driving the patterns of 
contribution growth in Cluster B5. 
In Cluster B2, although a few factors demonstrate significant impact on velocity and 
acceleration, as their impact on contributions is not significant, we do not interpret them. The 
factors that have a significant impact on contributions are the type of content produced by the 
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creator, more specifically whether the content comes from the comics and animation category. 
We find a positive impact on contributions for the first 120 days. [Insert Table 17] 
In Cluster B4, we see that factors that drive patrons to contribute are mainly perks, 
exclusive content, the number of words in the description and the number of platforms. These 
variables all have positive effects on the contribution across the entire crowdfunding period with 
number of platforms having an additional positive initial impact on velocity in the first 45 days. 
Furthermore, we note that for the first 105 days, it is important to ensure that the percentage of 
exclusive content is higher than free content as it will have a positive impact up to the 105th day. 
We find that having a sample of content in the project description will have an impact from the 
15th day onwards up to the final part of the crowdfunding process. We can conclude that generic 
projects that ask for contributions on a per item basis should focus on exclusive content as free 
content is not important, should have samples and a long project description as well as links to 
numerous platforms in order to maximize revenue. [Insert Table 18] 
8.3 IMPACT OF FACTORS ON PATTERNS OF CONTRIBUTION GROWTH FOR 
DURATION FOCUSED PROJECTS IN DIFFERENT CLUSTERS 
There are distinct differences in the clusters when we compare the average curves 
generated by each cluster. Notably, although Clusters C1 and C2 may be similar, with increasing 
contributions throughout most of the crowdfunding process and a decrease in contributions at the 
later stages. Cluster C3 display growth that is dissimilar, with contributions peaking at the early 
stages of the crowdfunding process, decreasing in the mid stages of the crowdfunding process 
before increasing to a higher peak and decreasing again at the later stages. This pattern was not 
obvious when we considered contribution curves as an aggregated group but appears distinctly 
after we have broken them down into smaller, homogenous groups. [Insert Figure 16] 
73 
 
We present the results for Cluster C2 and C3. As Cluster C4 is small, we are unable to 
recover coefficients for our factors of interest. Similarly, we find that C1 has no factor that has 
an impact on contributions and although a few factors demonstrate significant impact on velocity 
and acceleration, as their impact on contributions is not significant, we do not interpret them. 
We find that for Cluster C2, most variables only have an impact after the initial stage of 
the crowdfunding process. Content explicitness only has a negative impact on contributions after 
day 90 and lasts till day 270. Similarly, the presence of a sample only has a negative impact after 
day 135 till the end of the crowdfunding process. The number of words and milestone goals have 
a positive impact on contributions after day 60 and 120 respectively. [Insert Table 19] 
For Cluster C3, the generic cluster, we find that the nature of incentives matters the most 
to contributions, with number of perks, number of free content, number of exclusive content and 
percentage of exclusive content driving positive contribution growth throughout the entire 
period. We further note that the number of words and the fact that the content is explicit will also 
have a positive impact on contributions. We note that three particular factors - whether the 
content is explicit, number of exclusive content and percentage of exclusive content, have 
positive impacts on velocity as well. Creators collecting funds on a periodic basis can thus focus 
on these factors in attracting more funds. [Insert Table 20] 
9 DISCUSSION 
Our results provide evidence that patterns of recurring crowdfunding differ and factors 
that influence this difference in patterns have non-uniform effects throughout the entire 
crowdfunding process. We have further incorporated the heterogeneity of the curves into our 
model by striving to cluster them into groups with small within cluster heterogeneity. The results 
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from these clusters, especially the generic clusters, provide us with more accurate information on 
what factors affect patron growth, contribution growth and their respective velocities and 
acceleration.  
On a fundamental level, given that this is a relatively new crowdfunding model, we are 
able to provide specific recommendations to crowdfunding practitioners and the crowdfunding 
industry on what affects recurring contributions. Once the crowdfunding industry has gained a 
rudimentary understanding of this new patronage model, they will be able to better leverage this 
model to maximize the support they can gain from their patrons.  
Our main recommendations are constructed using the generic project results for each of 
our dependent variables – patron growth, contribution growth for item focused projects and 
contribution growth for duration focused projects.  
For patron growth, we recommend that creators have sufficient incentives in place to 
motivate potential patrons into supporting them. A good guideline would be to have a wide 
variety of perks and continuously produce a mixture of free and exclusive content while making 
sure that the value patrons receive from contributing is always higher by producing a larger 
proportion of exclusive content. The project description should be long and have a sample of the 
content that is being produced. However, projects should not have too many links to other 
platforms through the whole crowdfunding process or too many milestone goals in the initial 
period as potential patrons may view creators as overreaching and thus not join as a patron. 
For growth in contributions of projects collecting funds at a per item level, we 
recommend ensuring a wide variety of perks while producing more exclusive content. As free 
content has no impact and patrons are sensitive to the ratio of exclusive to free content, it is 
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plausible that a creator would want to choose to move entirely into creating only exclusive 
content. The project description should be long with a sample of the content created placed in the 
project page after the initial stages of adopting the patronage model. Creators should also ensure 
that patrons are able to reach them by having as many touch points as possible in the form of 
platform links in the project page.  
For growth in contributions of projects collecting funds at a per month level, we 
recommend ensuring a wide variety of perks, with more free content and exclusive content while 
making sure that the percentage of exclusive content relative to free content is always high. 
Having a long project description is also recommended along with creating explicit content.  
Crowdfunding platforms that are conducting recurring crowdfunding can make use of the 
information provided by our research by emphasizing, through the platform architecture, on 
factors that motivate a potential patron to back. For example, as exclusive content has a positive 
impact on patron growth and contribution growth, the crowdfunding site can intentionally 
separate exclusive content into a new tab and have visuals that draw attention to the tab 
whenever a user visits the project page. Similarly, for factors that have a negative impact, the 
platform can deemphasize the factor to increase patrons or contributions to the project page. 
Managing their website interface and directing users’ attention either to or away from these 
factors would in turn increase their revenues as well.  
Finally, from the average contribution curves, we have shown that the patronage model 
as a whole is able to generate substantial revenues for creators. This success will allow third 
party hosting platforms to maintain their creators as they can now ensure their creators have a 
sustainable source of income outside their current platform. Hosting platforms can thus advocate 
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recurring crowdfunding as a viable addition to their revenue sharing plans and thus prevent their 
creators from disengaging from the platform due to a lack of a stable income. 
9.1 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
We acknowledge that our research has several limitations in terms of the data. As this is 
the first paper that deals with recurring funding, we have used freely data available from the 
Patreon’s project page as possible variables that may drive change. Certain variables such as the 
number of words in a project description may not be able to provide a deeper understanding of 
the sentiments or quality of the project description apart from its length. Furthermore, as 
mentioned previously, the nature of recurring crowdfunding is to fund creators. These creators 
would already have a presence on a different platform before they decide to adopt a patronage 
model. Our research does not account for the variables that are in their content hosting platform 
such as the quality of previous content, the number of existing fan base or the popularity of the 
content hosting platform as the platforms vary too much and some content hosting platforms lack 
metrics that allow them to be cross-compared with other platforms (i.e. comparing Youtube with 
a personal webpage on stories). Future research can address these by using natural language 
processing methods to code the sentiment of the project description as well as collecting 
variables outside of the crowdfunding site. 
Our research may also suffer from limited length of the funding process. We currently 
use the project’s first 300 days and explore how our variables may impact the curve and its 
dynamics across this time period. However, some variables may only affect patterns at a later 
stage of the crowdfunding process, such as after the first year into the crowdfunding. Although 
our choice was motivated by platform changes as Patreon has decided to allow creators to hide 
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contribution information in 2017, future research can explore the possibility of collaborating 
directly with the crowdfunding platform or to use other crowdfunding sites to address this issue.  
9.2 CONCLUSION 
As research on the recurring crowdfunding process is in its nascent stage, with a lack of 
research on the phenomenon, our research has providing a theoretical framework to the recurring 
crowdfunding process and identifying the determinants that impact the patterns of growth for 
patron and contributions as well as dynamics such as velocity and acceleration on the rates of 
growth. We have further separated projects by grouping them into relatively homogenous groups 
and have identified the factors that can affect patron and contribution growth in each of these 
groups. In uncovering these significant factors, we provide practitioners in the field 
recommendations on which factor they should focus on at different stages of the crowdfunding 
process in order to maximize crowdfunding revenue. We hope that in using dynamic data, future 
research studying recurring contributions can continue study contribution growth while including 
the temporal dimension as it provides us with more granular information that can generate more 
specific recommendations at different stages of the entire process.  
CHAPTER 4: THESIS CONCLUSION 
The papers in this thesis addresses issues within the crowdfunding domain. Both papers 
explore constructs that have not been previously explored in the field. The implications derived 
from these studies serve as important contributions to this domain.  
In the first paper, the focus was on the typical crowdfunding model, with a single 
contribution by each backer for the entire duration of the crowdfunding process. The first paper 
explores influence between backers and recovers an implicit backer network using previous 
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backing behaviour of backers on the platform. The paper is able to identify influential backers 
and show that backers in central position within the network has an impact on other backers and 
through them, crowdfunding outcomes such as success, funding amount and rate at which the 
project reaches its funding goal.  
For the second paper, the focus is on a model that has not been explored by previous 
researchers of the crowdfunding domain – the recurring funding model. As there is no time limit 
to this model, the patterns of growth of patrons and contributions are not restricted by a fixed 
duration. This results in a wider variety of possible determinants with a larger range of potential 
effects across different stages of the crowdfunding process. We are able to identify determinants 
that impact patterns of patron and contribution growth across the different stages of the 
crowdfunding process.  
There is more work to be done in order to allow us to be fully satisfied with our results. 
For the first paper, in order to address concerns with interpretation of the weighted network, we 
have collected data on demohour, a Chinese crowdfunding site. Demohour provides information 
on the exact time a backer contributes to a crowdfunding project along with the contribution 
amount. This will allow us to form a directional weighted network to ensure that our results are 
robust even if time and funding data included. For the second paper, we are deliberating on the 
possibility of merging data found on Patreon with metrics found on the creators’ hosting 
platform. As cross comparability between platforms is a challenge, one possibility could be 
conducting multiple functional regressions across each sizable platform separately.  
We also provide several suggestions in the direction the field can progress. As we have 
established that crowdfunding is a phenomenon that is evolving and expanding, more research 
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needs to be conducted to understand the field. There have been new forms of crowdfunding that 
have evolved from the initial types of crowdfunding. We have explored in this research the 
changes between crowdfunding a project and its alternative of crowdfunding a creator, with 
Kickstarter creating a new platform to tap into that market. Similarly, equity crowdfunding has 
evolved with the inclusion of blockchain, which is a record for digital assets. Potential investors 
can now crowdfund a project that offers digital coins in exchange for an investment of Fiat 
currency (such as US Dollars) or cryptocurrency (such as Bitcoin), with Indiegogo creating a 
new platform to enter this new market (Indiegogo, 2018). With these models constantly evolving 
and with such a large financial impact on the online marketplace, research on crowdfunding 
needs to keep pace with these new models so that users of crowdfunding from the creators to 
backers and even the platforms themselves can ensure the most efficient and effective way to to 
stimulate progress and growth in crowdfunding.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1 Conceptual Model of Crowdfunding Success 
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Figure 2 Data for Network Estimation 
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Figure 3   Presence of Central Backers on Project Outcomes 
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Figure 4 Indirect Effects of Central Backers 
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Figure 5 Presence of Different Backers on Project Outcomes 
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Figure 7 Patterns of Crowdfunding projects and Crowdfunding Creators 
 
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project 4 Project 5 
Patrons 
Contributions 
Time 
Time 
Patterns for Crowdfunding Creators 
99 
 
Figure 8 Our Proposed Model 
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Figure 9 Smoothing Functions of Patreon Projects 
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Figure 10 Smoothing Contribution Functions of Item Focused Projects 
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Figure 11 Smoothing Contribution Functions of Duration Focused Projects 
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Figure 12 Sample Variables with Significant Impact on the dynamics of Recurring Contributions on Duration focused Projects 
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Figure 13 Functional Principal Component Analysis and Identifying Number of Clusters 
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Figure 14 Average Patron Function for Clusters 
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Figure 15 Average Contribution Function for Item based Project Clusters 
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Figure 16 Average Contribution Function for Duration based Project Clusters 
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Table 1 Our Contributions 
Published Papers Platform 
Changes 
Individual 
Backer Effects on 
other Backers 
Weighted 
Backer 
Networks 
Online Buzz Identifying 
Influential 
Backers 
 
Mollick (2014) 
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X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Lu et al (2015) 
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X 
 
X 
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Agrawal, Catalini and 
Goldfarb (2015) 
 
 
X 
 
✓ 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Burtch, Ghose and 
Wattal (2015) 
 
 
✓ 
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X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Ordanini et al (2015) 
 
X 
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Kuppuswamy and 
Bayus (2017) 
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This Current 
Research 
 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
 
 
✓ 
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Table 2 Data Sources and Data Items 
Classification Measures Meaning Source 
Project 
Outcomes 
Status Project Success or Failure Kickstarter Page 
% Funded Percentage of the Project Goal Funded Kickstarter Page 
Goal Rate Time taken for project to reach its goal Kickspy 
Backer 
Variables 
Central Backers No. of backers contributing to the project that 
are high on centrality measures 
Web Crawler 
Backers No. of backers contributing to the project that 
are not identified as central backers 
Kickstarter Page 
Project 
Characteristics 
Duration Total duration of the project Kickstarter Page 
Creator 
Experience 
No. of other projects created by the project 
creator 
Kickstarter Page 
Tiers No. of project reward tiers Kickstarter Page 
Video Presence of a video on the project page Kickstarter Page 
Updates No. of updates by the creator for the duration 
of the project 
Kickstarter Page 
Goal Amount The amount the project is seeking to raise Kickstarter Page 
Project Quality Innovativeness The novelty of a project from a technological 
and market standpoint 
Ratings of the 
Project Page 
Feasibility The likelihood of a project being a success in 
the market 
Ratings of the 
Project Page 
Digital Buzz 
Variables 
News & 
Review Sites 
No. of news & review sites reports for the 
duration of the project 
Web Search of 
News/Review sites 
Forums No. of forum threads created for the duration 
of the project 
Web Search of 
Forum Threads 
Online Media No. of media site posts created for the duration 
of the project 
Web Search of 
media sites  
Blogs No. of blog mentions posted for the duration 
of the project 
Web Search on 
Blogs 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics 
                    Correlation Matrix           
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1.Duration (log) 3.41 .33 1.00                 
2.Goal amount 
(log) 8.86 1.66 .22 1.00                
3. Forums 2.21 2.92 -.03 .14 1.00               
4. Media .54 1.35 .06 .24 .47 1.00              
5. Blogs .85 2.08 -.02 .19 .48 .47 1.00             
6. Social 75.64 429.01 -.01 .11 .50 .54 .51 1.00            
7. No. of Central 
Backers 1.33 2.24 -.10 .09 .39 .09 .26 .05 1.00           
8. No. of Backers 324.40 619.09 -.07 .21 .59 .54 .48 .45 .61 1.00          
9. Tiers 10.43 6.62 .19 .38 .21 .25 .29 .18 .06 .25 1.00         
10. Video .83 .37 .03 .20 .15 .15 -.03 .07 .16 .13 .23 1.00        
11. Updates 8.18 10.12 .09 .14 .35 .23 .29 .05 .40 .36 .40 .10 1.00       
12. Innovativeness 3.46 2.09 .06 .34 .21 .25 .25 .19 .29 .32 .33 .31 .26 1.00      
13. Feasibility 5.49 2.31 -.07 -.30 .08 -.05 -.02 -.09 .19 .08 -.06 -.01 .05 -.18 1.00     
14. Creator 
Experience 1.72 5.97 -.17 -.11 .06 -.05 -.01 -.03 .33 .07 -.15 .01 .01 .03 .13 1.00    
15. Status .50 .50 -.10 -.22 .39 .23 .31 .14 .51 .43 .20 .004 .46 .16 .18 .17 1.00   
16. Percent Funded 234.95 933.64 -.09 -.16 .12 .01 .04 .02 .33 .40 .02 -.02 .23 .13 .09 .07 .24 1.00  
17.  Goal Rate .20 .32 .06 .01 .19 .20 .19 .08 .21 .14 .18 .07 .27 .19 .01 -.03 .62 -.04 1.00 
Notes: Multicollinearity is not an issue with all variables having a VIF < 5. 
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Table 4 Results for the Games Category 
 Status % Funded Goal Rate 
 Status No. of 
Backers 
No. of 
Central 
Backers 
% Funded No. of 
Backers 
No. of 
Central 
Backers 
Goal Rate No. of 
Backers 
No. of 
Central 
Backers 
Outcome Variables 
No. of Backers 2.95(.77)***   5.94(.88)***   -.12(.04)***   
No. of Central 
Backers 
.41(.18)** .27(.02)***  -.15(.43) .27(.02)***  -.01(.02) .20(.03)***  
Project Characteristics 
Duration (log) -.005(.12)   -.07(.53)   .03(.03)   
Creator Experience -.002(.14)   -.001(.56)   -.05(.03)   
Tiers .35(.21)   -.04(.63)   -.02(.03)   
Updates .75(.28)***   1.47(.63)**   -.04(.03)   
Goal Amount (log) -1.28(.22)*** .06(.4) -.01(.11) -2.13(.57)*** .06(.04) -.01(.11) .18(.04)*** .11(.07) .41(.11)*** 
Project Quality Indicators       
Innovativeness 
 
.02(.04) .51(.11)*** 
 
.02(.04) .51(.11)*** -.03(.04) .05(.07) .34(.09)*** 
Feasibility 
 
.04(.04) .65(.13)*** 
 
.04(.04) .65(.13)*** -.01(.04) .07(.06) .49(.10)*** 
Video -.02(.14) -.05(.04) .16(.12) -.17(.55) -.05(.04) .16(.12) .03(.03) -.06(.06) .21(.11)* 
Digital Media Buzz Variables 
Forums -.18(.23) .14(.05)*** .35(.06)*** -.97(.70) .14(.05)*** .35(.06)*** -.03(.04) .15(.08)** .21(.07)*** 
Online Media -.13(.21) .31(.05)*** -.21(.11)* -1.73(.71)** .31(.05)*** -.21(.11)* .02(.04) .34(.08)*** -.38(.12)*** 
Blogs .53(.32) .02(.05) .27(.08)*** -.92(.68) .02(.05) .27(.08)*** -.01(.04) -.02(.07) .15(.09)* 
Social Media -.02(.60) .18(.05)*** -.16(.08)** -.40(.71) .18(.05)*** -.16(.08)** .02(.04) .17(.08)** -.08(.11) 
Log Likelihood -566.85 -2442.39 -341.83 
*** p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 
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Table 5  Alternative Backer Specifications & their Characteristics  
  
Status % Funded Goal Rate 
    Status Backers % Funded Backers Goal Rate Backers 
Using Large Backers (N=10) 
 
No. of Backers 
 
5.62(1.13)*** 
 
5.79(.71)*** 
 
-.15(.04)*** 
 
No. of Large Backers -1.39(.33)*** .04(.07) -.50(.79) .04(.07) .03(.05) .31(.12)*** 
Log-Likelihood -507.51 -2393.15 -232.93 
Using Exclusively Central Backers (N=10) 
    
No. of Backers 
 
2.88(.76)*** 
 
6.03(.88)*** 
 
-.11(.04)*** 
 
No. of central backers .53(.21)** .28(.03)*** -.22(.44) .28(.03)*** -.02(.02) .21(.03)*** 
Log-Likelihood -513.89 -2389.68 -315.57 
Using Degree to Identify Central Backers 
    
No. of Backers 
 
2.95(.77)*** 
 
5.94(.88)*** 
 
-.12(.04)*** 
 
No. of central backers .41(.17)** .27(.02)*** -.15(.43) .27(.02)*** -.01(.02) .20(.03)*** 
Log-Likelihood -566.86 -2442.39 -341.83 
Using Closeness to Identify Central Backers 
    
No. of Backers 
 
3.01(.65)*** 
 
5.82(.84)*** 
 
-.13(.04)*** 
 
No. of central backers .46(.18)*** .24(.02)*** -.05(.40) .24(.02)*** -.01(.02) .17(.03)*** 
Log-Likelihood -582.14 -2458.81 -349.55 
Using Betweenness to Identify Central Backers 
    
No. of Backers 
 
2.99(.79)*** 
 
5.66(.81)*** 
 
-.13(.04)*** 
 
No. of central backers .27(.16)* .29(.03)*** .12(.52) .29(.03)*** -.01(.02)*** .21(.05)*** 
Log-Likelihood -588.19 -2461.62 -335.44 
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Table 6 Robustness Checks 
  
  
Status % Funded Goal Rate 
Status Backers % Funded Backers Goal Rate Backers 
Using a larger pool of central backers (N=20) 
No. of Backers 2.70(.77)***  6.00(.91)***  -.11(.04)**  
No. of Central 
Backers .38(.14)*** .17(.01)*** -.11(.26) .17(.01)*** -.01(.01) .13(.02)*** 
Log-Likelihood -616.59 -2493.80 -380.30 
Using a larger pool of central backers (N=50) 
No. of Backers 2.79(.79)***  7.28(1.05)***  -.10(.05)*  
No. of Central 
Backers .17(.08)** .12(.01)*** -.33(.17)* .12(.01)*** -.01(.01) .10(.01)*** 
Log-Likelihood -670.12 -2542.81 -408.38 
Using a larger pool of central backers (N=100) 
No. of Backers 3.10(.82)***  7.19(1.12)***  -.09(.06)*  
No. of Central 
Backers .05(.05) .09(.01)*** -.22(.13) .09(.01)*** -.01(.01) .08(.01)*** 
Log-Likelihood -773.08 -2644.09 -449.53 
Results from the Design Category  
No. of Backers 3.63(.78)***  .92(.57)  -.11(.03)***  
No. of Central 
Backers -.14(.16) .40(.05)*** -.09(.50) .40(.05)*** -.03(.03) .39(.06)*** 
Log-Likelihood -686.11 -1500.67 -351.37 
Results from the Technology Category 
No. of Backers 3.48(.71)***  1.66(.22)***  -.08(.04)*  
No. of Central 
Backers -.20(.14) .21(.04)*** -.25(.17) .21(.04)*** -.08(.02)*** .15(.06)** 
Log-Likelihood -702.63 -1281.58 -285.82 
*** p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1 
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Table 7 Dealing with Endogeneity through Copula 
 Original 
Equation 
Copula Model 
No. of Central 
Backers 
307.46(28.79)*** 347.36(73.88)*** 
Duration (log) 
 
 
Creator Experience 
 
 
Tiers 
 
 
Updates 
 
 
Goal Amount (log) 38.55(27.05) 27.67(21.01) 
Innovativeness 11.75(28.39) 
 
Feasibility 23.22(26.26) 
 
Video -29.14(26.06) 
 
Forums 88.42(32.10)*** 88.12(30.86)*** 
Online Media 193.41(31.08)*** 191.31(50.58)*** 
Blogs 10.63(31.35) 32.76(29.08) 
Social Media 111.73(32.22)*** 99.21(173.29) 
Copula CF  -47.31(31.25) 
Adj R-squared 0.64 0.65 
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Table 8  Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Project Type 
Crowdfunding Type .26 .44 0 1 
Explicit Content .25 .43 0 1 
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks 4.07 2.60 0 34 
No. of Free Content 98.38 191.11 0 2318 
No. of Exclusive Content 100.96 195.42 0 3747 
% of Exclusive Content  .48 .35 0 1 
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video .37 .48 0 1 
No. of Words 271.29 278.16 0 8612 
Format .18 .39 0 1 
No. of Goals 2.78 2.57 0 21 
Sample .71 .45 0 1 
No. of Platforms 2.33 1.41 0 12 
Project Category 
Cat Writing .08 .27 0 1 
Cat Video .25 .43 0 1 
Cat Games .08 .26 0 1 
Cat Podcast .08 .27 0 1 
Cat Music .07 .25 0 1 
Cat Comics .19 .39 0 1 
Cat Photo .01 .11 0 1 
Cat Animation .03 .18 0 1 
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Table 9  Correlation of Independent Variables 
   Correlation Matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. Crowdfunding Type 1.00                    
2.Video .08 1.00                   
3.Sample -.03 .40 1.00                  
4.No. of Words -.01 .05 .15 1.00                 
5.Format -.04 -.01 .10 .20 1.00                
6.No. of Free Content -.09 .19 .10 .04 .03 1.00               
7.No. of Exclusive Content -.16 -.04 .07 .05 .12 .10 1.00              
8.% of Exclusive Content .13 .23 .04 -.02 -.06 .39 -.34 1.00             
9.No. of Goals -.06 .03 .12 .14 .11 .04 .11 -.06 1.00            
10.No. of Platforms -.08 .19 .28 .08 -.02 .12 -.001 .10 .09 1.00           
11.No. of Perks -.07 .12 .14 .13 .06 .05 .15 -.04 .34 .10 1.00          
12.Explicit Content -.10 -.23 -.03 -.04 .04 -.10 .19 -.26 .03 -.10 .01 1.00         
13. Cat Writing .04 -.11 -.09 .06 -.04 -.05 -.08 .01 -.03 -.07 -.02 -04 1.00        
14. Cat Videos -.02 .40 .08 -.01 -.08 .28 -.12 .27 -.02 .11 .00 -.24 -.17 1.00       
15. Cat Games -.02 -.06 .02 .15 .05 -.06 -.06 -.02 .02 -.07 -.06 .05 -.08 -.17 1.00      
16. Cat Podcasts .08 -.01 -.09 -.05 -.06 -.04 -.06 .05 .05 .03 .01 -.11 -.08 -.17 -.08 1.00     
17. Cat Music .19 .21 .06 .01 -.01 -.05 -.06 .08 -.03 .07 .10 -.14 -.08 -.16 -.08 -.08 1.00    
18. Cat Comics -.10 -.24 .04 -.04 .07 -.07 .22 -.24 .04 -.06 .01 .13 -.14 -.28 -.14 -.14 -.13 1.00   
19. Cat Photography -.02 .01 .02 .03 .03 -.01 .03 -.03 .04 -.01 .08 .03 -.03 -.06 -.03 -03 -.03 -.05 1.00  
20: Cat Animation .04 .04 .04 -.03 .02 -.03 .01 -.03 .02 -.04 -.01 .10 -.05 -.11 -.05 -.05 -.05 -.09 -.02 1.00 
Notes: Multicollinearity is not an issue with all variables having a VIF < 5. 
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Table 10 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on the Number of Patrons  
 Patron Functions (y) Patron Functions’ Velocity (v) Patron Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Project Type 
Crowdfunding Type 
 
   
 
  
 
  
Explicit Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Nature of Incentives  
No. of Perks  + 0-300  + 0-120  - 0-150 
No. of Free Content  + 0-300  + 0-150  - 0-185 
No. of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-240  - 150-195 
% of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-210  
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video    
 
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  + 0-300  + 80-190  + 270-300 
Format          
No. of Goals  - 0-165 
 
   - 255-300 
Sample 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos  + 0-300  + 75-210 
   
Cat Games  + 0-300  
  
 
  
Cat Podcasts  + 0-300  + 30-300  
  
Cat Music  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Comics  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation          
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Table 11 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on the Recurring Contributions for Item Focused Projects 
 
 Contribution Functions (y) Contribution Functions’ Velocity (v) Contribution Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant Period 
Project Type 
Explicit Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks  + 0-300  + | -  0-60 | 195-300  - 150-300 
No. of Free Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-240  + | - 0-45 | 120-300 
% of Exclusive Content  
  
 
  
 
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  + 0-300  
  
 + | - |+ 0-30 | 120-165 | 255-300 
Format        + 0-75 
No. of Goals 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Sample 
 
  
 
   - 0-30 
No. of Platforms 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos  + 30-300  + 90-135 
   
Cat Games  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Podcasts  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Music  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Comics  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation          
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Table 12 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on the Recurring Contributions for Period Focused Projects 
 
 Contribution Functions (y) Contribution Functions’ Velocity (v) Contribution Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant Period 
Project Type 
Explicit Content 
 
   + 0-45  - 0-75 
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks  + 0-300  + 0-60 & 285-300  - | + 60-150 | 225-300 
No. of Free Content  + 0-300  + 0-120  - 0-150 
No. of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 75-180 
   
% of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-75  
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  
  
 
  
 
  
Format          
No. of Goals 
 
   + 120-195  + | - 105-150 | 240-300 
Sample 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos  + 0-300 
      
Cat Games  + 0-300  
  
 
  
Cat Podcasts  + 0-300  + 75-180  
  
Cat Music  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Comics  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation     + 120-150    
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Table 13  Overview of Identified Clusters 
Function Clusters Cluster 
Size 
Content Category Avg. Range of Functions Cluster Description 
Patron 
Function 
A1 9 88.9% Video 3000 – 5200 Established Projects 
A2 28 32% Video, 18% Podcast, 14% Games, 14% Comics 1000-1500 Audio heavy Projects 
A3 154 30% Video, 21% Comics, 16% Games, 12% Podcast 250-500 Visual heavy Projects 
A4 3038 25% Video, 20% Art, 19% Comics 0-34 Generic Projects 
Item 
Focused 
Recurring 
Funding 
B1 4 50% Video, 25% Games, 25% Art 3500-6700 Hedonic Projects 
B2 89 34% Video, 27% Music 600-740 Audio heavy Projects 
B3 5 40% Video, 40% Music, 20% Art 17,000-21,000 Established Projects 
B4 725 22% Video, 15% Art, 14% Music, 13% Comics, 11% Writing 84-94 Generic Projects 
B5 19 42% Video, 11% Music, 11% Podcast, 11% Writing 1700-2500 Video heavy Projects 
Duration 
Focused 
Recurring 
Funding 
C1 119 32% Video, 16% Game, 16% Comics, 13% Podcast 2000-2800 Progression based Projects 
C2 21 29% Video, 24% Game, 19% Podcast 6500-9000 Content Requisite Projects 
C3 2241 25% Video, 22% Art, 22% Comics 200-212 Generic Projects 
C4 6 83% Video, 17% Art 21,000-26,000 Established Projects 
 *Distribution of Project Category – 25% Video, 20% Art, 19% Comics, 8% Writing, 8% Games, 8% Podcast, 7% Music, 3% Animation, 1% Photography 2% Misc  
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Table 14 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on Cluster A2  
 Patron Functions (y) Patron Functions’ Velocity (v) Patron Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Project Type 
Crowdfunding Type 
 
   
 
  
 
  
Explicit Content  - 0-300 
 
  
 
  
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks 
 
   - 240-300 
 
  
No. of Free Content  - 0-30  + 255-300 
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content  + 255-300  - 60-300 
   
% of Exclusive Content  
  
 - 270-300  
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  
  
 
  
 
  
Format  + 0-30  - 0-45    
No. of Goals  + 135-300 
 
  
 
  
Sample 
 
   - 0-15 
 
  
No. of Platforms  - 165-300  - 75-300  - | + 45-135 | 240-300 
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos 
   
 - 0-60 
   
Cat Games  + 0-15  - 0-210  + 255-300 
Cat Podcasts  
  
 - 0-60  
  
Cat Music  
  
 - 0-60  
  
Cat Comics  
  
 - 0-60  
  
Cat Photo  + 0-90  - 0-135    
Cat Animation          
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Table 15 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on Cluster A3  
 Patron Functions (y) Patron Functions’ Velocity (v) Patron Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Project Type 
Crowdfunding Type 
 
    + 255-300  + 225-300 
Explicit Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks 
 
   - 180-225 
 
  
No. of Free Content  + 0-135 
 
  
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content 
         
% of Exclusive Content  
  
 
  
 
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 + 285-300  
  
No. of Words  
  
 
  
 
  
Format          
No. of Goals 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Sample 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos 
         
Cat Games  + 0-240  
  
 
  
Cat Podcasts  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Music  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Comics  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation          
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Table 16 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on Cluster A4  
 Patron Functions (y) Patron Functions’ Velocity (v) Patron Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Project Type 
Crowdfunding Type 
 
   
 
  
 
  
Explicit Content  + 60-300   + 0-225  - 0-45 
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks  + 0-300  + 255-300  + 0-270 
No. of Free Content  + 0-300  + 0-45 
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-265  - 225-300 
% of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-30  - 0-45 
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  + 0-300  + 0-195  
  
Format          
No. of Goals  - 0-75   + 90-225 
 
  
Sample  + 0-300 
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms  - 0-300 
 
  
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing  + 0-300 
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos  + 0-300  + 105-300 
   
Cat Games  + 0-300  + 0-120  
  
Cat Podcasts  + 0-300  + 0-195  
  
Cat Music  + 0-300  + 0-15  - 0-15 | 285-300 
Cat Comics  + 0-300  
  
 
  
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation  + 0-300       
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Table 17 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on Cluster B2  
 Contribution Functions (y) Contribution Functions’ Velocity (v) Contribution Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant Period 
Project Type 
Explicit Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Free Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content 
         
% of Exclusive Content  
  
 
  
 
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  
  
 
  
 
  
Format          
No. of Goals 
 
   + 0-45 | 270-300  - 0-105 
Sample 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
   + 285-300 
 
  
Cat Videos 
   
 + 285-300 
   
Cat Games  
  
 - 120-195  
  
Cat Podcasts  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Music  
  
 
  
 + 240-300 
Cat Comics  + 0-120  
  
 
  
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation  + 0-120  - 120-195    
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Table 18 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on Cluster B4  
 Contribution Functions (y) Contribution Functions’ Velocity (v) Contribution Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant Period 
Project Type 
Explicit Content 
 
  
 
   - 0-30 
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks  + 0-300  - 150-210 
 
  
No. of Free Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content  + 0-300 
      
% of Exclusive Content  + 0-105  
  
 
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  + 0-300  
  
 
  
Format          
No. of Goals 
 
   + 120-210  + 0-75 
Sample  + 15-300 
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms  + 0-300  + 0-45 
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos  + 0-30 | 240-300  + 270-300 
   
Cat Games  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Podcasts  
  
 + 240-300  - 0-30 
Cat Music  
  
 
  
 - 0-30 
Cat Comics  
  
 
  
 - 0-45 
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation  + 0-300       
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Table 19 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on Cluster C2  
 Contribution Functions (y) Contribution Functions’ Velocity (v) Contribution Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant Period 
Project Type 
Explicit Content  - 90-270 
 
  
 
  
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Free Content 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content 
         
% of Exclusive Content  
  
 
  
 
  
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 + 285-300  
  
No. of Words  + 60-300  
  
 
  
Format          
No. of Goals  + 120-300 
 
  
 
  
Sample  - 135-300 
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Project Category 
Cat Writing  - 120-300 
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos 
         
Cat Games  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Podcasts  - 135-270  
  
 
  
Cat Music  
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Comics  - 150-300  
  
 
  
Cat Photo          
Cat Animation          
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Table 20 Summary of Results for the Impact of Project Characteristics on Cluster C3  
 Contribution Functions (y) Contribution Functions’ Velocity (v) Contribution Functions’ Acceleration (a) 
Variables Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant 
Period 
Effect Valence 
of Impact 
Significant Period 
Project Type 
Explicit Content  + 0-300  + 0-30  - 0-45 | 285-300 
Nature of Incentives 
No. of Perks  + 0-300 
 
  
 
  
No. of Free Content  + 0-300 
 
  
 
  
No. of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-225  - 210-300 
% of Exclusive Content  + 0-300  + 0-15 | 270-300  - 0-75 
Project Presentation Characteristics 
Video  
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Words  + 0-300  
  
 
  
Format          
No. of Goals 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Sample 
 
  
 
  
 
  
No. of Platforms 
 
  
 
   + 0-45 
Project Category 
Cat Writing 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Cat Videos  + 0-300 
      
Cat Games  + 0-300  
  
 
  
Cat Podcasts  + 0-300  
  
 
  
Cat Music  + 0-300  
  
 - 290-300 
Cat Comics  + 120-300  
  
 
  
Cat Photo     + 90-270    
Cat Animation  + 0-300       
 
